The Recognition of Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Rule: A Legislative Function? by DeGiuseppe, Jr., John
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 11 | Number 4 Article 1
1983
The Recognition of Public Policy Exceptions to the
Employment-at-Will Rule: A Legislative Function?
John DeGiuseppe, Jr.
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
John DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Recognition of Public Policy Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Rule: A Legislative Function?, 11 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 721 (1983).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol11/iss4/1
THE RECOGNITION OF PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL
RULE: A LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION?
Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr. *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 722
II. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE .......................... 723
A. Development of the At-Will Rule ................ 723
B. Application of the At-Will Rule .................. 726
1. Permanent Employment Contracts ............ 727
2. Contracts for a Definite Term ................ 731
III. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE .......................... 735
A. Federal Legislation ............................... 735
B. State Legislation .................................. 738
IV. EXCEPTrIONS TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE ...... 744
A. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair D ealing .............................. 745
1. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co ................... 746
2. M assachusetts Law .......................... 748
3. California Cases ............................ 751
B. The Public Policy Exception ..................... 753
1. Retaliatory Discharges ....................... 755
2. Recent Cases ............................... 758
3. Exclusivity of Remedy ....................... 761
V. ADHERENCE TO THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE ........ 767
A. Rejection of the "Good Faith" Condition .......... 768
B. Rejection of the Public Policy Exception .......... 770
1. New York Cases ............................. 771
2. Other Recent Decisions ...................... 773
VI. OTHER THEORIES OF RECOVERY ......................... 774
A. Tortious Interference With Employment Contracts . 775
B. Promissory and Equitable Estoppel ............... 777
• Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, New York, N.Y. Member
of the New York Bar. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977, Fordham University. The author was the
Editor-in-Chief of the Fordham Urban Law Journal, Volume V, 1976-1977. Recent
developments in the employment-at-will area prompted the author to supplement
and update his original article which appeared in Volume 10 of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal, 1981-1982.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
VII. THE EFFECT OF PERSONNEL POLICIES ON THE
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL RULE ........................ 778
A. Contractual Rights to Job Security ............... 779
1. M ichigan Cases ............................. 781
2. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc .................. 784
B. Contract Liability for Fringe Benefits ............. 786
1. Vacation Benefits ........................... 787
2. Forfeiture for Competition Clauses ............ 791
VIII. CONCLUSION ...... ....................................... 793
I. Introduction
Recent developments concerning the application of the employ-
ment-at-will rule' demonstrate that courts are reluctant to recognize
exceptions to the rule based on considerations of public policy in the
absence of a legislative mandate. This point is readily confirmed by
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Ameri-
can Home Products Corp.2 where the court declared that the recogni-
tion of a cause of action in tort for abusive discharge should be a
function of the state legislature. Other jurisdictions have also declined
to implement public policy exceptions to the at-will rule without
legislative action.3 Indeed, courts have been unwilling to imply pri-
vate causes of action to protect the rights of employees under federal
and state law.
Proposed "whistle-blower" and unjust dismissal legislation has been
introduced in a number of jurisdictions, but has had limited success. 4
1. For further discussion on the employment-at-will rule, see DeGiuseppe, The
Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job Security and
Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (1981).
2. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); see notes 305-14 infra and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case.
3. See cases cited in note 292 infra.
4. A number of commentaries have considered the adoption through statute or
case law of unjust dismissal protection for at-will employees. See generally Estrei-
cher, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal; The Appropriate
Judicial Response, 54 N.Y.S.B.J. 146 (1982); Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Glendon & Lev,
Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New
Property, 20 B.C.L. REV. 457 (1979); Mennemeier, Protections from Unjust Dis-
charges: An Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49 (1982); Summers, Individ-
ual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 418
(1976); Comment, Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L.
REV. 211 (1973); Comment, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980);
Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 1435 (1975); At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36
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Only Connecticut and Michigan have enacted comprehensive "whis-
tle-blower" protection for employees furthering a public interest to
the detriment of their employers. As with the common law exception
to the at-will rule, there may be difficulties in defining the parameters
of public policy under these statutes. Moreover, the extent to which
states can protect the rights of employees to receive fringe benefits has
also been questioned in recent decisions on the grounds of federal
preemption.
Courts, however, could become more willing to recognize implied-
in-fact contract rights to job security based on the "totality" of the
parties' employment relationship. Under this approach, protection for
employees from wrongful terminations may be derived from long-
standing common law principles of contract interpretation and obli-
gations without the need for legislative action. Similarly, private
causes of action under statutes may be implied based on the inade-
quacy of statutory relief or to further legislative intent in protecting
the rights of employees afforded by these laws.
This Article examines recent developments concerning the effect of
the employment-at-will rule on employee rights to job security and
fringe benefits. Federal and state legislation regulating the terms and
conditions of employment relationships is also examined. Finally, this
Article analyzes whether the recognition of public policy exceptions to
the at-will rule should be an exclusive function of the legislature.
II. Employment-at-Will Rule
A. Development of the At-Will Rule
The common law rule regarding employment relationships of an
indefinite duration emerged in the late nineteenth century as a direct
result of H.G. Wood's treatise on master-servant relationships.5
N.Y.C.B.A. REP. 170 (Apr. 1981); Feerick, Continued Erosion of Employment-at-
Will, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1; Feerick, Employment-at-Will Rule and
Unjust Dismissal, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Harmon & Kolko, Develop-
ments in the Law Covering Abusive Discharges, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 1, col.
3; Travis, Abusive-Discharge Cases to Test Common-Law Rule, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24,
1982, at 1, col. 2; Weiss, State by State: Chipping Away at Employment-at-Will,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 18, 1982, at 26, col. 1.
5. H.G. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1886). Prior to the nineteenth
century, the law regarding employment relationships of an indefinite duration was
based on the feudal doctrine of master and servant, which considered the master-
servant relationship as one primarily based on status rather than contract. Although
the enactment in 1562 of the English Statute of Laborers, 5 Eliz., ch. 4 (1562),
reinforced this doctrine by requiring certain classes of individuals to accept employ-
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Wood's rule "that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring
at will" was stated without further analysis based upon authority of
questionable value.6 The rule was incorporated into the American
common law in Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co. 7 and, by the
beginning of the twentieth century, became the primary authority
with respect to the termination of employment relationships for an
indefinite term. 8
ment, it also introduced the concepts of termination by notice and "on reasonable
cause." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131 (1878). The rule emerged under the
English common law that a general hiring for an unspecified duration was presumed
to be a hiring for a one-year period, terminable only for "just cause" prior to the
expiration of the implied one-year term. As the rule eventually evolved, employment
relationships, unless otherwise specified, could be terminated only by notice. Sum-
mary dismissals for cause were excepted from the notice requirements. See generally
DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 3-5; Summers, supra note 4, at 485.
6. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 6-7. In his treatise, Wood stated the
following rule:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much
a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite
hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at
the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve. . . . [I]t is an
indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will of either party, and in this
respect there is no distinction between domestic or other servants.
H.G. Wood, supra note 5, § 136.
None of the cases cited by Wood in support of his rule squarely support the general
proposition that an indefinite hiring is terminable at-will. See Wilder v. United
States, 5 Ct. Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd, 80 U.S. 254 (1872) (statute of limitations barred
creditor's claim against debtor for payment of a larger sum than agreed upon by
debtor); De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851) (new trial granted on issue of
whether defendant-innkeeper had right to eject forcefully plaintiff-barkeeper after
notifying him of his discharge); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870)
(court held that whether an oral employment contract was for a year or for a quarter
of a year was a question of fact for the jury and that the statute of frauds did not bar
an action by the employee for payment of wages during the second year of employ-
ment); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871) (court affirmed jury
verdict for plaintiff-employee where jury found that parties intended hiring to be for
a definite period of one year and plaintiff was fired after only eight months).
7. 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895). The court established that a hiring at an
annual salary does not make the employment for a year; rather, an employee hired at
such a salary was an employee-at-will and the employer was at liberty to terminate
him at any time. In adopting Wood's rule, the Martin court stated:
The decisions on this point in the lower courts have not been uniform,
but we think the rule is correctly stated by Mr. Wood and it has been
adopted in a number of states. . ..
It follows, therefore, that the hiring of the plaintiff was a hiring at will
and the defendant was at liberty to terminate the same at any time.
Id. at 121, 42 N.E. at 417 (citation omitted).
8. Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 628 (Hawaii 1982); see
generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 7; Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job
Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 342 (1974).
[Vol. XI
EMPLOYMENT-A T-WILL RULE
Reflecting a concern for economic growth and entrepreneurship,
the United States Supreme Court in Adair v. United States' affirmed
the at-will rule based on the principles of freedom of contract and
freedom of enterprise. 10 The Court in Adair held that the right to
discharge employees at will cannot be limited by federal legislation,
because such legislation would be repugnant to the fifth amendment
guarantees of personal liberty and liberty of contract." The Court in
Coppage v. Kansas12 subsequently declared unconstitutional under
the fourteenth amendment state legislation similar to the federal stat-
ute in Adair.13
Support for the employment-at-will rule was also based on the
contractual doctrine of mutuality of obligation. 14 In applying this
doctrine to employment relationships, courts reasoned "that if the
employee can end his employment at any time under any condition,
then the employer should have the same right."' 5 The contractual
doctrines of mutuality of remedy and consideration were similarly
raised as sufficient justification for the at-will rule.16
9. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional §
10 of the Erdman Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424, a statute which imposed
criminal penalties for the discharge or threatened discharge of interstate railroad
employees because of union membership.
10. Concerning the principles of freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise,
the Court in Adair stated:
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper
is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe
the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person
offering to sell it. So the right of the employee to quit the service of the
employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer,
for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee....
208 U.S. at 174-75.
11. Id. In this regard, the Court stated: "In all such particulars the employer and
the employee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is
an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can
legally justify in a free land." Id. at 175.
12. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
13. In Coppage the state statute provided that it was a misdemeanor, punishable
by fine or imprisonment, for an employer to require any of its employees to agree not
to become or remain a member of any labor organization during the course of his
employment. Id. at 6-7.
14. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Lim-
iting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1419-21
(1967) (discusses mutuality doctrine); Summers, supra note 4, at 484-85.
15. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128, 421 N.E.2d
876, 878 (1981) (citing Summers, supra note 4, at 484-85).
16. Murg & Scharman, Employment at Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the
Rule?, 23 B.C.L. REV. 329, 336 (1982). The following policy consideration for the at-
will rule was stated in Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate Inc., 174 La. 66, 67,
139 So. 760, 761 (1932):
1983]
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B. Application of the At-Will Rule
Most jurisdictions continue to recognize the rule that a hiring for an
indefinite term amounts to an employment-at-will which may be
terminated at any time by either party with or without cause or
notice. 17 Even those jurisdictions which have recognized exceptions to
the at-will rule based on considerations of public policy have con-
firmed their adherence to the rule in recent decisions. 8 In this regard,
one court has declared that its acceptance of the public policy excep-
tion was not intended "to be the death knell of the employment-at-
will doctrine." 19
Recent cases demonstrate that dismissals of employees under the at-
will rule continue to be sustained on numerous grounds. Pursuant to
the at-will rule, employees have been lawfully terminated for filing
workers' compensation claims, 2° refusing to submit to the sexual ad-
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently,
thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition;
indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and
the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself
Id.
17. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 25 n.25 and cases cited therein. The
following jurisdictions have recently affirmed their adherence to the at-will rule by
declining to recognize the public policy exception: Alabama: Meredith v. C.E.
Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982); District of Columbia: Ivy v. Army Times
Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981); Georgia: Taylor v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148
Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1981); Mississippi: Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co.,
397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); New Mexico: Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M.
789, 635 P.2d 992 (1981); New York: Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58
N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); Ohio: Dadas v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 529
F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Texas: Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633
S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). See also Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F.
Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (North Carolina and Virginia law); Forde v. Royal's Inc.,
537 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (Florida law).
18. See, e.g., Colorado: Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776, 781-
82 (D. Colo. 1982); Connecticut: Kilbride v. Dushkin Pub. Group, Inc., 186 Conn.
718, 443 A.2d 922 (1982); Massachusetts: Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300,
431 N.E.2d 908 (1982); Michigan: Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412
Mich. 692, 696, 316 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1982); Pennsylvania: Callahan v. Scott Paper
Co., 541 F. Supp. 550, 561-63 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Boresen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526
F. Supp. 1230, 1235 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
109 Wis. 2d 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1982) (petition for review pending); see
also Serafin v. City of Lexington, 547 F. Supp. 1118 (D. Neb. 1982); Wood v.
MARTA, No. C81-1204A (N.D. Ga. Oct. 25, 1982), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REm'.
(BNA) No. 233, at D-1 (Dec. 3, 1982) (employment-at-will rule affirmed in public
employment cases).1e . Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct. App.
1982) (petition for review pending).
20. Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Bottijliso v.
Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (1981); see also Sloane v. Southern
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vances of their supervisors, 2' complaining about the quality of their
employers' services,2 2 testifying truthfully against the interests of their
employers, 23 disclosing allegedly unlawful accounting practices, 24
refusing to provide accurate information to questions on their employ-
er's questionnaires, 25 criticizing company policies, 26 and, among other
things, smoking marijuana on the job. 27 The at-will rule has also been
applied to employment contracts alleged to be for a permanent or
definite term where such contracts were not supported by sufficient
consideration or did not reflect a mutual understanding of the parties
regarding a specific term of employment.
1. Permanent Employment Contracts
Contracts for permanent or lifetime employment continue to be
enforced with marked reluctance by the courts and- only in cases
where the commitment had been "clearly, specifically and definitely
expressed." 26 These contracts are generally considered to be agree-
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1085 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (reduction of disability
benefits in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim was not unlawful).
21. Forde v. Royal's, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
22. Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980) (complaints concerning
customer service and maintenance); Maus v. National Living Centers, Inc., 633
S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (complaints concerning poor patient care and
neglect).
23. Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982); Ivy v. Army
Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981).
24. Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981); Sucho-
dolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982); Murphy
v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
25. Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982).
26. Boresen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1230 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
27. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct. App.
1982) (petition for review pending) (other factors for the employee's dismissal in-
cluded his having an affair with a secretary, lack of attention to his job, and low
morale among his employees).
28. Borbely v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 959, 970 (D.N.J. 1981)
(citing Savarese v. Pyrene Mfg. Co., 9 N.J. 595, 601, 89 A.2d 237, 241 (1952)). It
should be noted that managerial personnel may need extraordinary hiring authority
to bind companies to contracts for permanent employment. Boleman v. Congdon &
Carpenter Co., 638 F.2d 2 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 824 (1981).
In Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903, 906 (Ala. 1982), the
following definition of "permanent employment" was stated:
In Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939), this
Court defined "permanent employment" as follows:
"It was said that what they meant by a permanent employment was so
long as defendant was engaged in the same nature of business and needed
the service of such an employee, and plaintiff was able and willing to do it
satisfactorily and gave no cause for his discharge.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
ments for an indefinite duration terminable at the will of either party
with or without cause or notice. 29 Courts have recognized, however,
that binding agreements for permanent employment may be created
where sufficient consideration other than services rendered has been
given by employees in a bargained-for exchange. 30 Mutuality of obli-
' "[P]ermanent" employment will be held to contemplate a continuous
engagement to endure as long as the employer shall be engaged in business
and have work for the employee to do and the latter shall perform the
service satisfactorily .... .' " (237 Ala. at 299, 186 So. 699.)
Thus, according to the above definition, an implicit term of the employ-
ment contract was that the employee would remain employed only if the
employer had need of the employee's services.
Contracts for broad, unspecified terms, however, are generally considered to be
terminable at will. See, e.g., Walker v. Modern Realty of Mo., Inc., 675 F.2d 1002
(8th Cir. 1982) (employment contract for "so long as it is mutually satisfactory to
both parties" was at-will agreement); Fleming v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 508 F. Supp.
917 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (promise to retain employee "as long as you perform satisfacto-
rily" not sufficient to create a contract); Ceib v. Alan Wood Steel Co., 419 F. Supp.
1205 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (vague promise of employment "until retirement" did not
create binding obligation); Lightcap v. Keaggy, 128 Pa. Super. 348, 194 A. 347
(1937) (employment for "so long as you live" did not give rise to an enforceable
contract); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764 (1977)
(no exception to at-will rule based solely on employee's subjective understanding that
he would be employed for "as long as he did his job in a satisfactory manner"). But
see Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (alleged oral contract for
"reasonable time" stated cause of action).
29. See, e.g., Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982)
(under Arkansas or Wisconsin law, employee hired as " 'a permanent member of the
staff' "was hired for an indefinite term of employment), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 1194
(1983); Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982) (under Maryland
law, no promise for lifetime employment based on statements of company vice
president and plaintiff's relinquishment of job position and benefits); Borbely v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 959 (D.N.J. 1981) (friendly assurances of
continued employment did not create contract for lifetime employment); Rogers v.
IBM Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (under Pennsylvania law, no contract
for "permanent" employment based on employer's "promote from within" policy and
statements in company manual); Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903
(Ala. 1982) (no agreement for permanent employment even though employee relin-
quished prior job for alleged contract); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.
2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (no agreement for permanent employment based
on six-month probationary period and annual reviews under merit plan); Pinsof v.
Pinsof, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d 525 (1982) (death benefit plan and stock
purchase agreement did not constitute contract for lifetime employment); Parker v.
United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982) (employee's personal
understanding of clause providing for "regular employment" upon completion of six-
month probationary clause did not create contract for permanent employment).
30. See, e.g., Scott v. Lane, 409 So. 2d 791 (Ala. 1982) (relinquishment of prior
employment based on promise of permanent employment); Martin v. Federal Life
Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982) (relinquishment of job offer in
exchange for promise of permanent employment stated cause of action); Pullman Co.
v. Ray, 201 Md. 268, 94 A.2d 266 (1953) (relinquishment of personal injury claim);
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gation is not essential to the creation of binding obligations for lifetime
employment. 31
Courts have closely scrutinized the sufficiency of the additional
consideration given by employees as well as the understanding of both
parties as to the duration of employment in determining whether an
agreement for permanent employment has in fact been made. It is
generally agreed that such an agreement may not be established solely
by the subjective understandings and expectations of employees con-
cerning the duration of their employment. 32 Accordingly, courts have
been reluctant to infer lifetime employment agreements from proba-
tionary clauses in company personnel manuals, 33 the terms and condi-
tions of company benefit plans, 34 or gratuitous statements made by
contra Ryan v. J.C. Penney Co., 627 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1980) (continued services of
employee did not support contract for permanent or otherwise definite term of
employment). See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226, 264-65 (1974) (discusses relin-
quishment of prior job).
In Heuvelman v. Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 235, 161
N.E.2d 875, 877 (1959), the court stated the following general rule for upholding
agreements for permanent employment:
Oral contracts for "permanent employment" (meaning that as long as
defendant was engaged in the prescribed work and as long as plaintiff was
able to do his work satisfactorily, defendant would employ him) have been
sustained, provided such contracts are supported by a consideration other
than the obligation of services to be performed on the one hand and wages
to be paid on the other.
31. Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982) (employee need
not promise to work for life for employer); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 I11.
App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982) (promises of parties need not be of same type to
constitute consideration); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 79
(1981). But see Hamlen v. Fairchild Indus., 413 So. 2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(mutuality of obligation required to support agreement for permanent employment).
It should be noted, however, that independent consideration is not needed to support
an employment contract for permanent employment based upon mutual promises.
See Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982);
Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 I11. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982).
32. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Roy Jorgensen Assocs. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Lasser v. Grunbaum Bros. Furniture Co., 46 Wash. 2d 408, 281 P.2d 832
(1955); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982). See
also Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982) (despite
employee's understanding of medical examination requirement, no contract for per-
manent employment existed where medical report disclosed serious medical condi-
tions).
33. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
Accord Gunn v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 474, 291 S.E.2d 779 (1982)
(one-year probationary clause in pilot's contract for indefinite term did not limit
employer's right to discharge at-will).
34. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (annual merit pay plan); Pinsof v. Pinsof, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d
525 (1982) (death benefit plan and stock purchase agreement).
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company representatives. 35 Even assurances of "steady" employment
may not suffice to establish a permanent employment contract termi-
nable only for "just cause." 36
Instead, courts have looked "at the alleged 'understanding,' the
intent of the parties, business custom and usage, the nature of the
employment, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances of the
case to ascertain the terms of the claimed agreement." 37 Oral agree-
ments for permanent employment, however, may not be enforceable
under the statute of frauds. 38 Moreover, the doctrines of promissory
and equitable estoppel cannot be used to create primary contractual
liability where none would have otherwise existed. 31
Recent cases demonstrate that the mere relinquishment of a job,
business, or profession by one who decides to accept a contract for
alleged permanent employment may not be sufficient consideration to
support an agreement for such employment. 40 In Page v. Carolina
35. Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982); Borbely v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 547 F. Supp. 959 (D.N.J. 1981).
36. Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d 181, 183
(1982) (citing Gensman v. West Coast Power Co., 3 Wash. 2d 404, 101 P.2d 316
(1940)).
37. Parker v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725, 649 P.2d 181, 183
(1982) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). See also Hodge v. Evans
Fin. Corp., No. 81-02726 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 1983).
38. Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Martin v.
Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982).
In most jurisdictions, oral contracts not capable of being performed within one
year are unenforceable under the applicable statute of frauds. "The test is simply
whether the contract by its terms is capable of full performance within a year, not
whether such occurrence is likely." Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d
596, 604, 440 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (1982) (citing Stein v. Malden Mills, Inc., 9 111. App.
3d 266, 292 N.E.2d 52 (1972)). Oral contracts for permanent or lifetime employment
are generally not considered to be barred by the statute of frauds. See Annot., 60
A.L.R.3d 226 (1974).
Nevertheless, the mere possibility that an employee could be terminated within a
year does not necessarily remove the alleged contract from the statute of frauds
prohibition. Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 45 111. App. 2d 10, 14-15, 195 N.E.2d
250, 252, aJJ'd, 31111. 2d 507, 202 N.E.2d 516 (1964). Nor does the possibility that an
employee may die or resign within the first year necessarily remove the oral agree-
ment from the prohibitions of the statute of frauds. Gilliland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 69
Ill. App. 3d 630, 633, 388 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1979). "Whether the possibility of an
employee's death or termination takes the employment agreement from the bar of the
Statute in a specific case depends in large part on the underlying purpose and specific
terms of the agreement itself." Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84, 87
(N.D. Ill. 1982); see Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441,
457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) (employment contract with no fixed term was not an
agreement which "by its terms" could not be performed within one year).
39. See Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903, 905 (Ala. 1982), and
cases cited therein.
40. Page v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982); Bates v. Jim
Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1982); see also C & P Tel. Co. v.
Murray, 198 Md. 526, 84 A.2d 870 (1951). Contra Grouse v. Group Health Plan,
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Coach Co.41 the Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, held that an
employee who merely relinquished his job and benefits as a union bus
driver to assume a non-union position did not provide sufficient con-
sideration to support his alleged lifetime employment contract. The
court also held that a statement by the defendant's vice president of
operations to plaintiff that he had made " 'a wise move' "" could not
reasonably be interpreted as a promise of lifetime employment, but




Adequate consideration to support a lifetime employment contract
may be found, however, where an employee agrees to forego a more
lucrative job offer in exchange for a promise of job security made by
an employer who desires to retain the services of a valuable em-
ployee. 43 Nevertheless, courts have recognized that not every relin-
quishment of a job offer or position will be sufficient consideration to
support an alleged agreement for permanent employment. 44 In this
regard, "[c]ourts have realized that a person necessarily must give up
or terminate a prior job in order to accept a new one and, absent other
circumstances, the relinquishment of the prior job does not render the
new employment offer as anything more than a hiring for indefinite
duration. 45
2. Contracts for a Definite Term
Employment contracts for a definite term are exempt from the
application of the employment-at-will rule. Whether an employment
relationship constitutes a hiring for a specific duration depends on the
facts and circumstances of each case. 46 In most jurisdictions, the speci-
Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (employer liable on theory of promissory estop-
pel for withdrawing job offer to employee who left prior job in reliance on the
employer's promise of employment).
41. 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982).
42. Id. at 1157-58.
43. Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 65 Ill. Dec. 143, 440
N.E.2d 998 (1982). See also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. O'Neal, No. 800856 (Va. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1982) (employee who resigned from prior position based on employer's
promise of new job supplied sufficient consideration for new position).
44. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982);
Heuvelman v. Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 23 Ill. App. 2d 231, 161 N.E.2d 875
(1959).
45. Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 603 n.1, 440 N.E.2d
998, 1004 n.1 (1982) (citing Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226 (1974), and cases cited
therein).
46. Gollberg v. Bramson Publishing Co., 685 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982); Dadas v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 529 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1981); Henkel v. Educational
Research Council, 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976). In Gollberg the court
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fication of an employee's salary for a specific period does not create a
contract for the period named.47 Independent consideration is not
required, however, to support an agreement for a definite term em-
ployment relationship provided that the agreement is based upon the
mutual promises of the parties. 48 Where an employment contract is
for a specified period, "just cause" is generally required for termina-
tion prior to the expiration date of the agreement. 49 Under the appro-
made the following statement concerning the existence of a contract for a definite
term:
Absent an expressed intent, and where, as here, there were no negotia-
tions respecting terminability, a court should look within the four corners
of the contract, and to the facts and circumstances surrounding the mak-
ing, performing, and terminating of the contract, including actions of the
parties and the prevailing practice, if any, in the industry. Henry v. J.B.
Publishing Co., 54 Mich. App. 409, 221 N.W.2d 174 (1974); Michigan
Crown Fender Co. v. Welch, 211 Mich. 148, 178 N.W. 684 (1920).
685 F.2d at 226-27. See also Paice v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 539 F. Supp. 458
(D. Md. 1982) (longevity of employment alone cannot form basis for continued
employment).
47. See Henkel v. Educational Research Council, 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 251, 344
N.E.2d 118, 119 (1976), where the court stated:
[I]n the absence of facts and circumstances which indicate that the agree-
ment is for a specific term, an employment contract which provides for an
annual rate of compensation, but makes no provision as to the duration of
the employment, is not a contract for one year, but is terminable at will by
either party.
Accord Myers v. Coradian Corp., 92 A.D.2d 643, 459 N.Y.S.2d 929 (3d Dep't 1983);
but see Weaver v. Shopsmith, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (Connecticut
law) (Henkel distinguished on grounds that employee's allegations of one-year em-
ployment contract based on payment of bonuses and reimbursement of relocation
expenses stated cause of action).
In certain jurisdictions, however, "a hiring at a stated sum per week, month or
year, is a definite employment for the period named." DuSesoi v. United Ref. Co.,
549 F. Supp. 1289, 1297-98 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (applying Texas law) (citing Dallas
Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)); accord Chas. S. Stifft
Co. v. Florsheim, 203 Ark. 1043, 159 S.W.2d 748 (1942); Putnam v. Producers' Live
Stock Mktg. Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934); Delzell v. Pope, 200 Tenn.
641, 294 S.W.2d 690 (1956); but see Garrison v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 55 Tenn. App.
419, 402 S.W.2d 462 (1965) (hiring at particular sum per specific period does not
raise presumption of employment for that period); War-Pak, Inc. v. Rice, 604
S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (no contract for a definite term where only
evidence was employee's salary).
48. Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv. Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487, 492 (W.D. Ark.
1982).
49. Alpern v. Hurwitz, 644 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1981); Ghalam v. Tesson Ferry,
Inc., 560 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Chapin v. Klein, 128 Ariz. 94, 623 P.2d
1250 (Ct. App. 1981); Rosecrans v. Intermountain Soap & Chem. Co., 100 Idaho
785, 605 P.2d 963 (Idaho 1980); Crane v. Perfect Film & Chem. Corp., 38 A.D.2d
288, 329 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep't 1972); Lone Star Steel Co. v. Wahl, 636 S.W.2d 217
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982). But see Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643
P.2d 1276 (Or. 1982) (employer's definition of "just cause" will control unless other-
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priate circumstances, a contract may be renewed automatically for
another full term where the employee works beyond the period fixed
in the agreement.5 0
The types of agreements which will be deemed to create employ-
ment contracts for a definite term have been the subject of recent
judicial scrutiny.5 1 In Gollberg v. Bramson Publishing Co. 52 plaintiff-
employee claimed that his written employment agreement guaranteed
him employment with the defendant for one year. Paragraph 2 of the
agreement stated:
The terms of this agreement shall be from January 3, 1978, for a
period of one year, and shall continue from year to year, thereaf-
ter, unless terminated pursuant to paragraph 8, inJra.51
The provisions of paragraph 8 of the plaintiff's employment agree-
ment provided for the immediate termination of the agreement upon
notice or plaintiff's death. 54 Plaintiff, who was summarily discharged
on June 16, 1978, sued for breach of contract alleging that the "unless
terminated" language of paragraph 2 did not affect his guaranteed
right to one year of employment from January 3, 1978.
Relying on prior case law and industry practice, the Gollberg court
rejected plaintiffs contentions that the termination provision of his
employment agreement only applied to the renewal periods rather
wise agreed). See also Shoucair v. Read, 88 A.D.2d 718, 451 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't
1982) (termination of employment contract terminable upon notice for failing to
obtain permanent medical license was valid).
50. Foster v. Springfield Clinic, 88 Ill. App. 3d 459, 410 N.E.2d 604 (1980)
(express one-year contract was extended for an additional term by implication where
doctor worked three weeks beyond expiration date). The court in Foster stated that
following rule in support of its decision:
It has been repeatedly held that, where one party enters the employment
of another under a special contract fixing the time and price to be paid,
and continues in such employment after the term has elapsed, it will be
presumed that the hiring and service were under the original contract.
Id. at 463, 410 N.E.2d at 607 (quoting Crane Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 142 Ill. 125,
130, 30 N.E. 1030, 1032 (1892)).
51. Gollberg v. Bramson Publishing Co., 685 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982); Weaver
v. Shopsmith, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (Connecticut law); Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
52. 685 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. Id. at 225.
54. Paragraph 8 of the agreement stated:
This agreement shall be terminable immediately upon the date of mailing
of written notice by either party to the other, addressed by registered mail,
return receipt requested, to the last known business address of the respec-
tive parties, or upon the death of Sales Representative.
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than the initial period of his employment.55 In reaching its decision,
the court rejected any arguments based on the plaintiff's expectation
of employment for a one-year period.56 Accordingly, the court held
that the plaintiff's contract of employment was terminable at-will.
Courts have similarly rejected arguments that annual performance
reviews create contracts for one-year periods.5 7 In Muller v. Strom-
berg Carlson Corp.58 plaintiff-employee claimed that annual perform-
ance reviews under a company merit pay plan created a series of one-
year employment contracts with specified salary increases, subject
only to his satisfactory performance s.5 The court upheld the plaintiff's
discharge on the grounds that the provisions of the merit pay arrange-
ment did not establish "that the parties ever intended a definite term
of employment or specific salary increases. '"60 Because the plaintiff
55. Id. at 227. The Gollberg court relied on Brekken v. Reader's Digest Special
Prods., Inc., 353 F.2d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 1965), where an employment contract
containing the following clause was found to be terminable at-will:
This agreement shall be effective from the date of execution and shall
remain in effect for a period of twelve months and will be automatically
renewed for twelve-month terms unless sooner terminated.
This agreement may be terminated by either party upon written notice
or by Manager's death.
Plaintiffs in Brekken argued that the phrase "unless sooner terminated" only applied
to the renewal periods after the expiration of the initial period of employment. The
Brekken court rejected this contention as being the mere expectations of the plaintiffs
unsupported by "any tenable legal foundation." Id.
56. 685 F.2d at 229-30 (citing Brekken v. Reader's Digest Special Prods., Inc.,
353 F.2d 505, 506 (7th Cir. 1965)), where the court stated:
It cannot be doubted as plaintiffs assert that they expected their employ-
ment to continue for at least one year, but that was merely an expectation
and not a right guaranteed by the contracts which they signed. The courts
cannot rewrite the contracts which they made.
57. Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Garcia v. Aetna Fin. Co., No. 80-A-1002 (D. Colo. Feb. 5, 1981); Mann v.
Ben Tire Distribs., Ltd., 89 Ill. App. 3d 695, 411 N.E.2d 1235 (1980).
58. 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
59. Plaintiff alleged that he was told by defendant "that he would become a
.permanent' employee after a six-month probationary period and would remain
employed as long as evaluations of his performance were satisfactory." Id. at 268.
Plaintiff also claimed that the defendant had breached his employment contract by
not giving the full salary increases to which he was entitled under the merit pay plan
for the years 1979-1981.
The defendant's merit pay plan required employees and their supervisors to formu-
late and carry out yearly objectives. Employees were evaluated annually to deter-
mine how well they fulfilled their objectives. The supervisors then made salary
increase recommendations which were reviewed and subject to the approval of
higher managerial personnel. Id.
60. Id. at 268. The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the defendant
was required to give him specific annual salary increases.
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failed to produce any other evidence establishing that the parties had
intended to create a definite term of employment, the court declined
to recognize his subjective expectations regarding the tenure of his
employment. 6'
III. Statutory Limitations on the Employment-at-Will Rule
Current federal and state legislation regulating the terms and con-
ditions of employment relationships is directly attributable to the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Texas & New Orleans
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks"2 and
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 3 In these decisions, the Court
recognized the congressional power under the Commerce Clause to
give employees the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own selection without the threat of discharge
or other punitive action. The Court thus rejected the holdings of Adair
v. United States6 4 and Coppage v. Kansas5 that legislation cannot
constitutionally limit the principle of freedom of contract.
A. Federal Legislation
Federal legislation protecting the rights of employees is extensive.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 6 provides employees in
61. Id. (citing Roy Jorgensen Assocs. v. Deschenes, 409 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)). The Muller court, in reaching its decision, distinguished American
Agronomics Corp. v. Ross, 309 So. 2d 582 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 321 So.
2d 558 (Fla. 1975), in which an employee was found to have an enforceable contract
for a definite term based on a letter confirming his employment and specifying
several dates over a one-year period on which his performance would be reviewed. In
distinguishing this case, the Muller court stated that Ross involved a document
supported by testimony purporting to set out the terms of the employee's employment
whereas the plaintiff merely alleged that company policy gave rise to an enforceable
contract. 427 So. 2d at 269.
62. 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930) (Court upheld constitutionality of the Railway
Labor Act); see notes 68-69 infra and DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 16-17, for a
discussion of the Railway Labor Act.
63. 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (Court upheld constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act); see notes 66-67 infra and DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 17-19, for a
discussion of the National Labor Relations Act.
64. 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
65. 236 U.S. 1 (1915); see notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
66. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The NLRA, or Wagner Act,
was significantly amended in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations Act, Act of
June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136-52, and by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519. Health Care Amendments to the NLRA were adopted in 1974, Act of July
26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
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industries affecting commerce with the right to organize, bargain
collectively and "engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. .... ,,. 7
Similarly, the provisions of the Railway Labor Act6 8 are designed to
prevent employer interference with the rights of employees in the
railroad and airline industries to select bargaining representatives
without the threat of termination or coercion.69 Federal statutes also
prohibit employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex
or national origin, 70 age, 7 ' and physical handicap.
72
67. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The "mutual aid or protection" language
of § 7 of the NLRA protects employees in both organized and unorganized shops
irrespective or whether union activity is involved or collective bargaining is contem-
plated. See, e.g., Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-67 (1978) (political
activity); Jim Causley Pontiac v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 122, 127 (6th Cir. 1980) (safety
complaints); Pleasant View Rest Home, 194 N.L.R.B. 426 (1971) (working condi-
tions). Even supervisory discharges may be unlawful where they interfere with the
right of employees to exercise their rights under § 7 of the NLRA. Parker-Robb
Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. No. 58, 110 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1982). Accord Howard
Johnson Co. v. NLRB, 702 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
Under § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), employers are prohib-
ited from discriminating "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage" union membership.
Id. The NLRB in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982), set forth the following burden of
persuasion test for § 8(a)(3) cases:
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a prima facie
showing sufficient to support the inference that protected conduct was a
"motivating factor" in the employer's decision. Once this is established,
the burden will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same action
would have taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct.
251 N.L.R.B. at 1089. Contrary to the NLRB's holding in Wright Line, several
circuits had held that the ultimate burden of persuasion should always remain with
the General Counsel. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 674 F.2d 130 (1st
Cir. 1982); NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Center, 112 L.R.R.M. 2633 (2d Cir.
1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3791 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1983) (No. 82-1705);
Behring Int'l, Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 83, 87-91, opinion modified, 110 L.R.R.M.
2423 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Sept. 13, 1982)
(No. 82-438); NLRB v. Webb Ford, Inc., 689 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1982). The
United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., No.
82-168 (U.S. June 15, 1983), held that the NLRB's allocation of the burden of proof
was "clearly reasonable" under the NLRA.
68. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976).
69. See Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 543 (1937)
("The prohibition against such interference was continued and made more explicit by
the amendment of 1934.")
70. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980).
71. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980) (prohibits age-based discrimination against persons between the
ages of 40 and 70).
72. Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). The Act provides that where any federal department enters into a contract in
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Other federal legislation includes so-called "whistle-blower" stat-
utes73 designed to encourage employees to report without threat of
discharge employer violations of the environmental or safety stan-
dards set forth in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 7 the Air
Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 75 the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act,76 and the Railroad Safety Act. 77 Employees are similarly
protected from discharge under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA)78 for filing safety complaints79 or for refusing to
work under conditions which they reasonably believe to be dangerous
to their safety.80
A number of other federal statutes have been enacted to protect
employees from discharge because of the garnishment of their wages
for any single indebtedness, 8' the assertion of their rights under federal
wage and overtime laws,8 2 or their status as veterans of the Vietnam
excess of $2,500 the contract shall require affirmative action to employ qualified
handicapped individuals. Id. § 793(a). A handicapped person who believes a viola-
tion has occurred may file a complaint with the Department of Labor. Id. § 793(b).
73. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 20-21 & nn.86-89 for a further discussion of
these statutes. In general, these statutes prohibit an employer from discharging or
otherwise discriminating against an employee who has commenced or caused to be
commenced a proceeding to enforce a statutory requirement, or has testified, partici-
pated, or assisted in the proceeding. Reinstatement and back pay may be awarded.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (Supp. IV 1980); 29 C.F.R. Pt. 24 (1983) (procedures for
handling discrimination complaints under federal employment protection statutes).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (Supp. IV 1980).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1976).
77. 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (1976). Other federal "whistle-blower" statutes include:
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1976); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (1976).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976).
79. Chapel Elec. Co., 1980 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) 24,157 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(discharge prohibited under 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) where "substantial reason" for the
termination is an employee's engagement in protected activity).
80. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980) (upheld 29 C.F.R. §
1977.12(b)(2) which permits an employee to refuse to work under hazardous condi-
tions provided the refusal is reasonable and in good faith).
81. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1977).
82. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b)(1976). The federal
wage laws become applicable to most firms which enter federal contracts. Under the
Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276a (1976), a government contract in excess of $2,000
for construction or maintenance of a public building or public works shall provide
that hired laborers and mechanics will be paid the federal minimum wage rate. Id. §
276(a).
Similarly, under the Walsh-Healey Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980), a government contract for materials or equipment which exceeds $10,000 shall
provide that all persons employed by the contractor will be paid not less than the
federal minimum wage.
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War.8 3 Under the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),8 4 employers may not discharge employ-
ees in order to prevent them from attaining vested rights to pension or
welfare benefits.85 Federal civil service employees are also statutorily
protected from unfair discharges. 88
B. State Legislation
Over twenty-five jurisdictions adopted legislation in 1982 affecting
employer-employee relations.8 7 Although few significant labor rela-
tions laws were enacted by the state legislatures, statutory measures
were implemented protecting employees against unjust discharge, dis-
crimination and discipline.88 Proposed legislation has been introduced
in certain jurisdictions concerning so-called "whistle-blower" and
other unjust dismissal protection for employees.89
83. Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§
2021(b)(1), 2024(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (returning veterans cannot be discharged
for six months except for "cause"); see also Selective Service Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021
(a)(2)(A) (1976) (veterans discharged from the armed services may return to their
prior jobs).
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1976).
85. See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir. 1983); Calhoun v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp. 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979). See also Petrella v. NL
Indus., 529 F. Supp. 1357 (D.N.J. 1982) (causes of action sustained under ERISA for
alleged deprivation of severance and vacation benefits).
86. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503, 7513(a) (Supp. V 1981)
(discharge of federal civil service employees is permitted only "for such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service"). See also Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent
the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 942 (1976).
87 See generally DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 250, at C-1 to C-10 (Dec. 19, 1982).
88. See notes 90-96 & 101-03 infra and accompanying text.
89. In New York a "whistle-blower" bill was reintroduced in the 1983 session of
the State Legislature. See Legislative Gazette, Feb. 7, 1983, at 9. S. 1153, N.Y. Leg.,
1983-1984 Reg. Sess. (1983). S. 1153 provides in pertinent part:
2. Prohibitions. An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel
action against an employee because the employee, or a person acting on
behalf of the employee, does any of the following:
(a) discloses, or is about to disclose, to a supervisory authority or to a
public body an activity, policy, or practice of the employer that the
employee reasonably believes to be a violation of law or regulation, or that
the employee reasonably believes poses a substantial and impending dan-
ger to public health or safety; or
(b) provides information to, testifies before, or otherwise cooperates
with a public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry; or
(c) objects to, or refuses to participate in, an activity, policy or practice
that the employee reasonably believes involves a violation of law or regula-
tion, or that the employee reasonably believes poses a substantial and
impending danger to public health or safety; and
(d) if the employee is a public employee, in addition to any of the
foregoing, discloses to a supervisory authority or public body an activity,
policy, or practice of the employing organization that the public employee
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Michigan 0 and Connecticut9 ' have recently enacted "whistle-
blower" statutes prohibiting both public and private employers from
discharging, threatening or otherwise discriminating against employ-
reasonably believes to be substantial mismanagement, gross waste of
funds, or abuse of public authority.
Id. § 2.
In order to be protected under paragraphs 2(a) and (d) of the New York bill,
employees may be required to report to and allow their superiors a "reasonable
opportunity" to correct the alleged violation. Exceptions to this reporting require-
ment are made where the supervisor is already aware of the nature of the violation,
where the delay would cause "serious and imminent danger" to the physical safety of
these employees or where other individuals could be endangered by reporting the
violation to the supervisors. Id. § 3. Moreover, S. 1153 permits an aggrieved em-
ployee to bring a civil action for injunctive relief, reinstatement, lost wages, court
costs and attorney's fees, punitive damages as well as a civil fine of up to $10,000. Id.
§9 5-6. An interesting feature of S. 1153 permits an employee to disclose to the news
media a situation which presents a serious imminent threat to human health or safety
where disclosure has already been made to a government body and the government
body failed to take appropriate action within a reasonable time. See also note 231
infra.
A bill (S. 9566; A. 12451) concerning "whistle-blower" protection had been passed
in 1982 by the New York State Assembly, but failed to gain the needed support in the
State Senate. Similarly, a "whistle-blower" bill was defeated in the New Jersey
Legislature in 1982. See Fidell & Marcoux, The Dept. of Labor Grapples with
Growing Number of Whistleblowers, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 4, 1983, at 25 n. 14, col. 4.
A proposed "Unjust Dismissal of Employees Act" providing for the arbitration of
such dismissals was also submitted to the labor committees of the New York State
Assembly and Senate during the 1983 session. The provisions of this proposed legisla-
tion would be applicable only to non-union workers employed by enterprises having
500 or more employees. Other proposed unjust dismissal legislation was introduced in
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin during either the 1981 or 1982 sessions of the
state legislatures. See The Employment-at-Will Issue, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at 66-
79 (Nov. 19, 1982) for the provisions of these bills.
90. Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 15.361-15.369
(West 1981). The Michigan act covers both public and private employers, including
the State, having one or more employees. Id. § 15.361 (1)(b). Employees must bring
a civil action within 90 days after the occurrence of an alleged violation of the act.
Id. § 15.363(1). Employees must show by "clear and convincing evidence" that they
were about to report a violation or suspected violation of the law prior to their
discharge. Id. § 15.363(4). The statute does not impair the rights of employees under
any collective bargaining agreeement. Id. § 15.366.
91. Act of May 28, 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-289, §§ 1-2 (effective Oct. 1, 1982)
(reported in 1982 Conn. Legis. Serv. 1056 (West)). The Connecticut act covers all
persons engaged in business who have employees, including political subdivisions of
the State but excluding the State. Id. § 1(a)(2). Employees under the Connecticut law
have the right, after exhausting available administrative remedies, to commence a
civil action within 90 days after the final administrative determination is rendered or
the occurrence of the alleged violation, whichever is later. Id. § 1(c). The act does
not adversely affect rights granted by collective bargaining agreements. Id. § l(d).
Whether the new Connecticut law will be considered the exclusive remedy for
whistle-blowing is not clear based on the decision in Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods,
Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), and the lack of specific statutory language
to that effect.
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ees who report actual or suspected violations of any federal, state, or
municipal law or regulation unless the employee knows the report to
be false.9 2 These laws also protect employees who are "requested by a
public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held
by that public body, or a court action." 93 Employees may be rein-
stated with full back pay, seniority and fringe benefits, including
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 9 4
Other jurisdictions have also enacted unjust dismissal legislation.
Washington, for example, passed a law in 1982 prohibiting public
employers from disciplining or taking other retaliatory action against
92. The Connecticut statute provides:
No employer shall discharge, discipline or otherwise penalize any em-
ployee because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the em-
ployee, reports, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation
of any state or federal law or regulation or any municipal ordinance or
regulation to a public body, or because an employee is requested by a
public body to participate in an investigation, hearing or inquiry held by
that public body, or a court action. The provisions of this subsection shall
not be applicable when the employee knows that such report is false.
Act of May 28, 1982, Pub. Act. No. 82-289, § 1(b) (reported in 1982 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 1057).
The Michigan act states:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate
against an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms, con-
ditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a
person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report,
verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or
regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political
subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the
employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is re-
quested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing or
inquiry by that public body, or a court action.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981).
93. Act of May 28, 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-289, § 1(b) (reported in 1982 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 1057); MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981).
94. The Connecticut statute provides that an employee may commence an action
"for the reinstatement of his previous job, payment of back wages and reestablish-
ment of employee benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled if such
violation had not occurred." Act of May 28, 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-289, § 1(c)
(reported in 1982 Conn. Legis. Serv. 1057).
The Michigan act provides for the following relief:
A court, in rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this act,
shall order, as the court considers appropriate, reinstatement of the em-
ployee, the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits
and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of these reme-
dies. A court may also award the complainant all or a portion of the costs
of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the
court determines that the award is appropriate.
MicH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 15.364 (West 1981).
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employees who report to the state auditor improper governmental
actions or the misuse of public funds.,5 Maryland recently imple-
mented a statute prohibiting employers from discharging or refusing
to hire individuals because of expunged criminal charges about which
applicants for employment need not answer.96 The Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico has a "discharge without just cause" law, containing
indemnification provisions for wrongfully terminated employees
based on an individual's length of service with the company. 97
95. 1982 Wash. Legis. Serv. 795 (West). Chapter 208, § 5 provides that any
employee who makes a good faith report to the auditor and is subjected to reprisal or
retaliatory action within a two-year period may seek judicial review and may be
entitled to attorneys' fees. Id. at 797. The auditor is directed to establish a program to
contact the employee periodically during the two years after the disclosure was
made. Id.
For purposes of this act, "reprisal or retaliatory action" is broadly defined, includ-
ing: denial of adequate staff, frequent staff changes, refusal to assign meaningful
work, frequent and undesirable office changes, as well as demotion, suspension, and
dismissal. Id.
96. MD. CmIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 740(a) & (c) (1982 & Supp. 1982). The statute,
as amended in 1982, provides:
An employer or educational institution may not in any application, inter-
view, or otherwise, require an applicant for employment or admission to
disclose information concerning criminal charges against him that have
been expunged. An applicant need not, in answering any question con-
cerning criminal charges that have not resulted in a conviction, or in
answering any questions concerning convictions pardoned by the Gover-
nor, include a reference to or information concerning charges that have
been expunged. An employer may not discharge or refuse to hire a person
solely because of his refusal to disclose information concerning criminal
charges against him that have been expunged.
Id. § 740(a). A violation of this statute constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by a
$1000 fine, one year in prison or both. Id. § 740(d). Furthermore, if the violator is a
state employee, the person is subject to dismissal. Id. § 740(c).
97. P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 29, §§ 185a-185i (Supp. 1978). Section 185b of the
Puerto Rico statute defines "good cause" as follows:
Good cause for the discharge of an employee of an establishment shall
be understood to be:
(a) That the worker indulges in a pattern of improper or disorderly
conduct.
(b) The attitude of the employee of not performing his work in an
efficient manner or of doing it belatedly and negligently or in violation of
the standards of quality of the product produced or handled by the estab-
lishment.
(c) Repeated violations by the employee of the reasonable rules and
regulations established for the operation of the establishment, provided a
written copy thereof has been timely furnished to the employee.
(d) Full, temporary or partial closing of the operations of the establish-
ment.
(e) Technological or reorganization changes as well as changes of style,
design or nature of the product made or handled by the establishment and
in the services rendered to the public.
1983]
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Existing state equal employment laws prohibit discriminatory dis-
charges or treatment based on race, color, religion, national origin or
sex, age,99 and physical handicap. 00 A new California statute pro-
hibits harassment of employees or applicants for employment because
of the foregoing factors as well as ancestry, medical condition and
marital status.' 0 ' Pennsylvania and West Virginia have recently
banned employment discrimination based on certain other disabili-
ties. 10 2 Fair employment legislation was also adopted in 1982 in a
number of other jurisdictions. 10 3
(f) Reductions in employment made necessary by a reduction in the
volume of production, sales or profits, anticipated or prevalent at the time
of discharge.
A discharge made by mere whim or fancy of the employer or without
cause related to the proper and normal operation of the establishment
shall not be considered as a discharge for good cause.
Id. § 185(b). In addition to back wages, employees dismissed without good cause are
entitled to one month's salary plus one week's salary for each year of service. Id. §
185a. Employees may bring an action within three years from the effective date of
the discharge. Id. § 185i.
98. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Supp. 1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
12940(a) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 292, 296 (McKinney 1982); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(A) (Page 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon
Supp. 1982-1983).
99. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24A (Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1983) ($500
maximum penalty for discrimination against any person between age 45 and 65);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976) (unlawful practice to
refuse to hire or to discharge any person because of age); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
37.2202(a)(1) (Supp. 1982-1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 955(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(A) (Supp.
1982).
100. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 24K (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292, 296
(McKinney 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7(A) (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1983-1984).
101. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(i) (West Supp. 1983). To establish harassment, the
employee must prove "loss of tangible job benefits." In addition, employers who
willfully violate the provisions of the state equal pay act may be subject to fines up to
$10,000 or imprisonment, or both. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311 (West. Supp. 1983).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) (non-job related
handicap or disability); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(a) (Supp. 1982) (handicap). Cf. N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c(2) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (subjects any person, firm
or corporation which discriminates against or harasses an individual on the basis of
disability to a fine).
103. See, e.g., Louisiana: employment discrimination or discharge of persons with
sickle cell trait is prohibited, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1002(A) & (B) (West Supp.
1983); Wisconsin: employment discrimination based on individual's marital status or
arrest or conviction record, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.32(1) & (12) (definitions);
111.321 (bases of discrimination); 111.322 (prohibition); 111.335 (arrest: excep-
tions); 111.345 (marital status exceptions) (West Supp. 1982-1983); hiring decisions
or promotion procedures conditioned on an individual's sexual orientation, id. §
111.36(d)(1) (West Supp. 1982-1983).
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Many states have labor-management relations acts similar to the
provisions of the NLRA.10 4 As with the federal legislation, these stat-
utes guarantee employees the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing without fear of
discharge or other retaliation. 105 In addition, state labor laws, like the
NLRA, protect employees against discharges or other discriminatory
actions designed to encourage or discourage union membership. 106
Various state laws also prohibit employers from discharging or
taking other punitive action against employees to influence or control
their votes, political activities or opinions; 107 for refusing to take
polygraph' 018 or psychological stress evaluation tests' 09 as a condition
104. See notes 66-67 supra and accompanying text.
105. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 704(10) (McKinney 1977); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150A,
§§ 3-4 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976).
106. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-105(5) (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150A,
§ 4(3) (Michie/Law. Coop. 1976); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 423.16 (1978); N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 704(5) (McKinney 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.6(1)(c) (Purdon 1964).
107. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1971); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108
(1973) (misdemeanor and private cause of action); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 56, § 33
(Michie/Law. Coop. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040 (1979); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW
§ 107(1) (McKinney 1973).
108. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia prohibit the use of poly-
graphs by employers in all or certain circumstances. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §
432.2 (West 1971 & Supp. 1982) (requires written notice of right to refuse test);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31.51g (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1966); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 36-802 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (Supp. 1982-1983);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19B (Michie/Law
Coop. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.225, 659.227 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
7321 (Purdon 1973); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5 (Supp. 1983); see generally COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE USE OF POLYGRAPHS BY EMPLOYERS: A RECOMMENDATION FOR
PROHIBITION 486 & nn.27-29 (1981); Flaherty, Polygraphs: The Big Lie?, Nat'l L.J.,
Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
Twenty-three states have adopted licensing requirements for polygraph operators.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 493.40 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 2401-6
(Smith-Hurd 1978 & Supp. 1982-1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7154 (Supp.
1982-1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 338.1701-10 (1976); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-11
& 79-29-31 (1972 & Supp. 1982); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1901-1929 (1981); OR. REV.
STAT. § 703.010-100 (1981); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29cc) (Vernon
1976 & Supp. 1982-1983). The States of Maine, Michigan, Nebraska and Oregon
combine licensing requirements with a limited statutory ban to establish the permis-
sible uses of polygraphs. For example, the Michigan statute provides that an exam-
iner may lose his license for failing to inform the examinee that he cannot be
discharged from his job because he refuses to take the test or halts the exam. MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1719(1) (1976).
An employee discharged for refusing to take a lie detector test may have a cause of
action in tort for abusive discharge. See Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.
1981) (tort action permitted where employee signed release prior to polygraph test
which was required condition to continued employment); Perks v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
109. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 735(1) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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of employment; for serving as jurors; 1 0 for appearing as witnesses in
criminal actions;"' for wage assignments or income executions;"' for
filing workers' compensation claims; 113 for asserting their rights under
minimum wage laws; 114 for refusing to be fingerprinted;" 5 and for
commencing or participating in certain court or public body actions
against the employer." 8 Occupational safety and health laws were
recently passed in Wisconsin '7 and Connecticut I" requiring employ-
ers to inform employees of the identities and hazardous effects of toxic
substances used in the workplace. California enacted a statute in 1982
prohibiting employers from discharging or laying-off employees who
refuse to work for companies in violation of state health and safety
requirements. "9
IV. Exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Rule
Common law exceptions to the employment-at-will rule based on
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and on consider-
ations of public policy have been recognized in a number of jurisdic-
tions. Although recovery in tort has been allowed for breaches of the
implied "good faith" condition, 20 certain jurisdictions have specifi-
110. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230 (West Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE § 2-218
(1979) (violation constitutes criminal contempt and employee may bring civil suit to
recover lost wages, attorney fees and to be reinstated); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, §
14A (Michie/Law. Coop. 1980) (violation constitutes contempt of court); N.Y. JUD.
LAW § 519 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
111. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 3-a(c) (McKinney 1982).
112. N.Y. Civ. PnRc. LAW § 5252 (McKinney 1978).
113. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 120 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 97-6.1 (1979). See also Dielectric Corp. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n,
111 Wis. 2d 270, 330 N.W.2d 606 (1983) (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.35(3) (West Supp.
1982-1983) requires employers to rehire employees injured in the course of employ-
ment who are reemployable).
114. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 662(1) (McKinney 1977).
115. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-a (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
116. CAL. LAB. CODE § 98.6 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 215 (McKinney
Supp. 1982-1983).
117. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.581(1) (West Supp. 1982-1983). See generally Right-
to-Know Laws in Nine States Protect Employees Against Hazardous Workplace
Substances, Survey Shows, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 3, at C-1 (Jan. 5, 1983).
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-40c (1981).
119. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311 (West Supp. 1983).
120. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982); Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537
F. Supp. 1076, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 1982); accord Kaiser Steel Told to Pay $4.7 Million
in Damages to a Former Foreman, Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1982, at 38, col. 4 (punitive
damages awarded for breach of "good faith" condition by wrongful discharge);
$300,000 Award in IBM Sex Suit, San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 19, 1981, at 3, col.
1 (punitive damages awarded to female managerial employee who was in effect
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cally declined to recognize a tort remedy for "bad faith" terminations
of employment.. 21 Recovery in tort has been granted for abusive
discharges in violation of public policy, 122 even in the face of specific
statutory remedies designed to safeguard the public policies in ques-
tion. 123
A. Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Certain jurisdictions continue to recognize an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in employment-at-will relationships.
124
Causes of action have been sustained for the breach of the "good
faith" condition based on considerations of public policy 25 and to
prevent terminations of employment designed to deprive employees of
accrued benefits.12 California has recognized that an implied promise
on the part of employers not to terminate employees arbitrarily or
without cause can exist based on the "totality of the parties' relation-
ship.' ' 127 Courts have not, however, "equated the absence of good
cause for the discharge of an employee with the absence of good
faith." 128
"discharged" as a result of a reassignment for having an affair with an executive from
a competing company).
121. See, e.g., Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d
998 (1982); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see also
Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 884, & n.7, 438 N.E.2d
351, 356 & n.7 (1982) (employee should not be entitled to benefits not included in his
contract or contemplated by parties).
122. See notes 176-231 infra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 250-59 infra and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1982); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980); Cort
v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982); Cloutier v. Great Ati. &
Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981). See also Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Ct. App. 1982) (petition for review
pending) (recovery recognized for terminations made in bad faith or with malice).
125. See, e.g., Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); Cloutier v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140
(1981); see also Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982)
(claim for breach of "good faith" condition can be maintained on public policy
grounds).
126. See, e.g., Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438
N.E.2d 351 (1982); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d
1251 (1977).
127. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
128. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 2294-95, 429
N.E.2d 21, 26 (1981) (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. at
104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257).
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1. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co. 2 9 held that a "termination by the employer of a contract of
employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the economic system
or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment con-
tract." 30 Monge involved the discharge of a married employee with
three children for refusing to "be nice" to her foreman. The "public
good" found to exist in Monge was an implied rather than express
public policy embodied in federal or state law. 3' Monge was subse-
quently cited by a federal court in Pstragowski v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.' 32 as standing for the broad proposition under New
Hampshire law that "an employee who is discharged by reason of the
bad faith, malice, or retaliatory motives of his employer has a right of
action for breach of contract, notwithstanding the fact that he was an
employee at will." 33
Nevertheless, the application of Monge was limited by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire in Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co. 34 "to a
situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an
act that public policy would condemn." 35 The court held that termi-
nations of employment based on sickness or age did not fall within this
"narrow category." 36 The court cited medical insurance and applica-
129. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); for a further discussion of Monge, see
DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 24-25.
130. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
The Monge court, in support of this rule, stated:
Such a rule affords the employee a certain stability of employment and
does not interfere with the employer's normal exercise of his right to
discharge, which is necessary to permit him to operate his business effi-
ciently and profitably.
Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
131. The public policy to which the Monge court addressed itself was a general
public interest-the " best interest of the economic system or the public good." Id. at
133, 316 A.2d at 551. Based on this public policy, the Monge court affirmed the jury's
verdict for the plaintiff for 20 weeks of lost wages.
132. 553 F.2d 1, 2 (1st. Cir. 1977). The federal court in Pstragowski affirmed a
jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff-salesman on the grounds that there was sufficient
evidence that his discharge had been motivated by the defendant's malice. Id. at 2.
133. Id.; accord Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.N.H. 1974).
134. 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980). In Howard the court considered
whether decedent-employee had been discharged in violation of Monge based on his
age, his illness, and for the purpose of denying him accrued retirement benefits.
135. Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274.
136. Id. The court also held that the decedent-employee, who was 50 years old at
the time of his discharge, had not been discharged for the purpose of denying him
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ble equal employment laws as being the "proper" remedies respec-
tively for discharges based on these considerations. 137
The most recent pronouncement on the application of Monge was
made by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Cloutier v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. ,38 where the court stated:
Howard and Monge together impose a two-part test which plain-
tiffs must meet to establish a ... cause of action. First, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant was motivated by bad faith, malice,
or retaliation in terminating the plaintiff's employment....
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was discharged
because he performed an act that public policy would encourage,
or refused to do something that public policy would condemn. 3
The Cloutier court, in stating this rule, noted that expressions of
public policy can be based on nonstatutory sources and that " 'strong
and clear public policy' " is not required to sustain a cause of action
for wrongful discharge. 140
Although the rule stated in Cloutier for claims of "bad faith" dis-
charge appears to be a further limitation on Monge, the facts of
Cloutier demonstrate the continued willingness of the New Hamp-
shire courts to impose the "good faith" condition on at-will relation-
ships. The plaintiff, a store manager for one of the defendant's stores
in a dangerous area, was summarily discharged for the failure of an
assistant manager on the plaintiff's day-off to make a required bank
deposit of store funds which were stolen during a burglary on the
same day. 141 Under company policy, the defendant held the plaintiff
retirement benefits which would have accrued at age 55. Id. On the same day that
Howard was decided, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Tice v. Thomson, 120
N.H. 313, 414 A.2d 1288 (1980), held that Monge was not applicable to public
employees.
137. 114 N.H. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274; but see Cancellier v. Federated Dep't
Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1318 & n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982)
(obligation to deal in "good faith" under company personnel policies not dependent
on age); McKinney v. National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980)
("good faith" condition breached by discharge based on age).
138. 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
139. Id. at 921-22, 436 A.2d at 1143-44 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 922, 436 A.2d at 1144. This view was espoused in the dissenting
opinion in Cloutier on the grounds that to do otherwise would place the determina-
tion of public policy within the province of the jury rather than the legislature. Id. at
927, 436 A.2d at 1147 (Bois, J., dissenting). See note 274 infra for cases dismissing
retaliatory discharge claims on grounds that public policy should be determined by
the legislature.
141. 121 N.H. at 921, 436 A.2d at 1143. Company policy required two daily
deposits of store funds by two employees. Police protection at a charge of three
dollars per trip had been provided by the defendant prior to the implementation of
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ultimately responsible "at all times" for store funds and thus summar-
ily fired him for his negligence in failing to handle the funds in the
appropriate manner, even though he had been an exemplary em-
ployee for thirty-six years. 41
Based on the reasons for his dismissal and the manner in which he
was terminated after thirty-six years of exemplary service, the
Cloutier court found that the defendant had acted in bad faith and
with malice in discharging the plaintiff. 143 The court also found no
less than three independent sources of public policy for sustaining the
plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, the most notable being derived
from the provisions of OSHA 144 and the mandate of state law requir-
ing a day of rest for all workers. 4 5
2. Massachusetts Law
In Fortune v. National Cash Register Co. ,146 Massachusetts adopted
the rule that an employment-at-will contract may, under the appro-
priate circumstances, contain "an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, and a termination not made in good faith constitutes a
this policy, but was terminated "to save costs." Id. "The plaintiff's supervisors,
however, told him that if any employees feared for their lives they could leave the
money in the safe overnight and deposit it the next day." Id., 436 A.2d at 1143.
142. Id. at 922, 436 A.2d at 1144.
143. Id. at 921-22, 436 A.2d at 1144. The plaintiff was suspended after a five
minute meeting and subsequently discharged without being informed of the allega-
tions made against him for his" 'violation of company bookkeeping procedure.' " Id.
at 918, 436 A.2d at 1142, 1144. The Cloutier court found that these facts constituted
bad faith and malice under Monge. Id. at 921, 436 A.2d at 1144. The finding of bad
faith was also based on the defendant's discharge of the plaintiff for a practice which
it condoned. Id., 436 A.2d at 1144.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1976); see notes 78-80 supra for a further discussion of
OSHA. As noted by the court, the provisions of § 654(a) require an employer to
"furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are
free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm to his employees." 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1976). The Cloutier court
found that defendant had breached this directive by requiring the plaintiff to make
bank deposits of store funds without police protection. 121 N.H. at 923, 436 A.2d at
1145. The court also stated that, "with or without the existence of OSHA, the facts
before us support the conclusion that the plaintiff was discharged for furthering the
laudable public policy objective of protecting the employees who worked under
him." Id., 436 A.2d at 1145.
145. Id. at 923-24, 436 A.2d at 1145. The Cloutier court reasoned that by holding
the plaintiff responsible "at all times" for store funds, the defendant deprived him of
the day of rest mandated by N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:33 (1977). 121 N.H. at 923-
24, 436 A.2d at 1145.
146. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); see DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 27-
28, for a further discussion of Fortune.
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breach of the contract."1 47 The Fortune court, however, declined to
adopt the "broad policy" cited in Monge regarding the application of
the "good faith" condition to employment relationships or to speculate
"whether the good faith requirement is implicit in every contract for
employment at will." 48 The court in Fortune did hold that the dis-
charge of the plaintiff, an at-will employee, in order to avoid paying
him certain commissions otherwise due to him on a five million dollar
sale constituted a breach of the "good faith" obligation.14
Recent decisions demonstrate that employees may have enforceable
claims under Massachusetts law for "bad faith" terminations involving
deprivation of benefits 50 as well as violations of public policy. ' 51 The
Massachusetts courts "have not decided, however, to impose liability
on an employer for breach of a condition of good faith and fair
dealing in the discharge of an employee simply because there was no
good cause for the employee's discharge."' 5 2 For discharges of this
nature, an employee may recover under the rule established in Gram
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 153 damages for "identifiable, reason-
147. 373 Mass. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
148. Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
149. Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. In affirming the jury verdict in favor of the
plaintiff, the court citing Monge stated:
We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to employ-
ment contracts the rule that "in every contract there is an implied cove-
nant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of
destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of
the contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing .. "
Id. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (citations omitted) (quoting Druker v. Roland Wm.
Jutras Assocs., 370 Mass. 383, 385, 348 N.E.2d 763, 765 (1976)). The rationale of
Fortune was subsequently extended to cover discharges based on age, McKinney v.
National Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980), and discharges designed
to prevent the imminent accrual of retirement benefits, Horrigan v. General Motors
Corp., No. 77-3302-2 (D. Mass. July 23, 1980). See also Comment, McKinney v.
National Dairy Council: The Employee at Will Relationship in Massachusetts, 16
NEW ENG. L. REV. 285 (1981).
150. See, e.g., Maddaloni v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 386 Mass. 877, 438
N.E.2d 351 (1982); Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 433
N.E.2d 103, appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1103, 440 N.E.2d 1176 (1982).
151. Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982).
152. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 2295, 429 N.E.2d
21, 26 ("nor have we equated the absence of good cause for the discharge of an
employee with the absence of good faith."); accord Siles v. Travenol Laboratories,
Inc., 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103, appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1103, 440
N.E.2d 1176 (1982). See also Ward v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 15 Mass.
App. Ct. 98, 443 N.E.2d 1342 (1983) (finding of "bad faith" not required for breach
of employment contract for definite term).
153. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N.E.2d 21. The plaintiff-salesman in Gram
was discharged for sending personalized, xeroxed notes to customers with whom he
had dealt allegedly in violation of company policy. The court affirmed the jury's
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ably anticipated future compensation, based on his past services, that
he lost because of his discharge without cause."15 4
In Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co.155 plaintiff-salesmen alleged that they
were terminated in "bad faith" for refusing to answer certain ques-
tions on a company questionnaire which they claimed were "highly
personal and offensive," and not for poor job performance as con-
tended by the defendant. 15 In affirming the judgments for the de-
fendant, the court declined, in the absence of some deprivation of
benefit as set forth in Fortune and Gram, to impose liability on the
defendant for failing to provide the plaintiffs with job security or the
true reasons for their discharge. 157 While noting that the public policy
protecting against unlawful invasions of privacy could give rise to a
claim for a "bad faith" discharge, 58 the court held that the questions
verdict that the plaintiff had not violated any company policy and, therefore, was
terminated without cause. Id. at 2298, 429 N.E.2d at 27-28. The court, however,
found no basis for concluding that the defendant's discharge of the plaintiff was
motivated by a desire to obtain the benefit of his reserved commissions or that the
defendant even considered the matter. Id.
154. Id. at 2287, 429 N.E.2d at 22. The court stated, "[w]e think that the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing imposed on an employer requires that the
employer be liable for the loss of compensation that is so clearly related to an
employee's past service, when the employee is discharged without good cause." Id. at
2300, 429 N.E.2d at 29 (citations omitted). In reaching this decision, the court
recognized an objective test for establishing the absence of "good faith" for an alleged
wrongful discharge. Id. at 2301 & n.10, 429 N.E.2d at 29 & n.10.
155. 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982).
156. Id. at 302, 431 N.E.2d at 909. The court described the questionnaires as
follows:
The questionnaire, entitled Biographical Summary, sought information
which, it represented, would be held in strict confidence. The subjects
covered included business experience, education, family, home ownership,
physical data, activities, and aims. In general, each plaintiff furnished
answers to the questions concerning his business experience, education,
and family. Their answers concerning their medical histories are varied.
None of the plaintiffs answered the questions under the headings
"AIMS." These questions concerning "AIMS," which we regard as appro-
priate to ask of a salesman and not improperly intrusive on his privacy
rights, asked each to state his qualifications for his job, his principal
strengths, his principal weaknesses, activities in which he preferred not to
engage, the income he would need to live the way he would like to live,
and his plans for the future.
Id. at 308-09, 431 N.E.2d at 913 (footnotes omitted).
157. Id. at 304-05, 431 N.E.2d at 910-11.
158. The court noted that, under the provisions of MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 1B
(1974 & Supp. 1983), an employer's request for information which constituted "un-
reasonable, substantial or serious interference with [an employee's] privacy would
contravene public policy and warrant the imposition" of a liability for discharges
based on failure to comply with such a request. 385 Mass. at 306-07, 431 N.E.2d at
912.
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which the plaintiffs refused to answer "were no more intrusive than
those asked on an application for life insurance or for a bank loan." 59
A cause of action for a "bad faith" discharge to avoid the payment
of earned commissions was sustained in Maddaloni v. Western Mass.
Bus Lines, Inc.160 where the plaintiff, pursuant to a written compen-
sation agreement terminable at-will, used his experience and expertise
to obtain for the defendant interstate charter rights from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission. Relying on Fortune, the Maddaloni
court stated that the plaintiff "could reasonably expect that his em-
ployment would not be terminated by the defendant in order to deny
him commissions."' 16' A "bad faith" discharge claim for allegedly
earned commissions was rejected, however, Siles v. Travenol Labora-
tories, Inc.'6 2 where the plaintiff was dismissed for having a verbal
confrontation with a customer and there was no evidence that the
defendant would keep for itself commissions which would become due
on sales accounts originated by the plaintiff. 63
3. California Cases
Under California law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may exist in employment-at-will contracts based on the "total-
ity of the parties' relationship."' 1 4 The California rule was first ap-
plied in Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. ,165 a case involving the
summary discharge of an employee for alleged theft after eighteen
years of "satisfactory" employment without the benefit of a "fair,
impartial and objective" hearing as required by express company
policy. Based on these facts, the Cleary court held "that the longevity
159. 385 Mass. at 310, 431 N.E.2d at 914 ("Most of the unanswered questions
were relevant to the plaintiffs' job qualifications and represented no invasion of the
plaintiffs' rights of privacy protected by law.").
160. 386 Mass. 877, 438 N.E.2d 351 (1982).
161. Id. at 881-82, 438 N.E.2d at 354. The court held that the plaintiff was
entitled to the $61,000 in commissions which he could have "reasonably" been
expected to be paid. Id. at 883, 438 N.E.2d at 355. A majority of the court agreed,
however, that the plaintiff was not entitled to lost wages and fringe benefits unre-
lated to past services. Id. at 884, 438 N.E.2d at 356. In this regard, the court stated:
"We need not decide in what circumstances public policy may require additional
damages, or a different measure of damages." Id. at 884 n.7, 438 N.E.2d at 356 n.7.
162. 13 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103, appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1103, 440
N.E.2d 1176 (1982).
163. Id. at 358-59, 433 N.E.2d at 106. The court also held the defendant's refusal
to give the plaintiff business references was not improper under the circumstances.
Id. at 359, 433 N.E.2d at 107.
164. See generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 28-30; Note, Defining Public
Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REV. 153 (1981).
165. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). The plaintiff also relied on
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to support his claim.
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of the employee's service, together with the expressed policy of the
employer, operate as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of
such an employee without good cause."166
The scope of the California rule was clarified in Pugh v. See's
Candies, Inc. 16 7 where a company vice president was allegedly termi-
nated after thirty-two years of service for his opposition to the negotia-
tion of a "sweetheart" contract with the union resulting in lower
salaries for female employees. Relying on Cleary, the Pugh court held
that the implied "good faith" condition could exist under the facts of
the instant case based on "the duration of [plaintiff's] employment,
the commendations and promotions he received, the apparent lack of
any direct criticism of his work, the assurances he was given, and the
employer's acknowledged policies." 68
Moreover, federal courts, applying California law, have recently
held that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may entitle wrongfully terminated employees to relief in both
contract and tort.' In Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc.,170 for
example, a federal district court held that an employee's allegation
that he was discharged for refusing to violate Thai law, thereby
subjecting himself to the risk of imprisonment, stated a cause of action
in contract and tort under the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 7 ' As support for its decision, the Crossen court reasoned that
166. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The Clearly court noted that a cause of
action for wrongful termination in breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing would sound in both contract and tort.
.167. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
168. Id. at 329, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927. See also Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal.
App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982) (based on Pugh, plaintiff was allowed to
amend his complaint to allege facts supporting an implied "good cause" termination
standard).
169. See, e.g., Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982); Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F.
Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982). But see Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849
(C.D. Cal. 1983) (written contract provision precluded "just cause" determination).
170. 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
171. Id. at 1078. The alleged violations cited by the plaintiff were the following:
(1) Making false statements on factory license applications to the Thai
government incidental to seeking approval of expansion of factory facili-
ties;
(2) Violating certain sanitary laws controlling the manner in which milk
and ice cream were transported to various customers;
(3) Bribing Thai government officials and police to terminate criminal
investigations and to obtain special treatment in the processing of certain
government licenses;
(4) Misrepresenting the financial condition and projected income of ice
cream parlors to prospective Thai franchisees;
(5) Violating Thai exchange control regulations;
(6) Submitting falsified tax returns to the Thai government.
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the citation of Monge and Fortune by the California Supreme Court
in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 172 the decision which established
the tort of wrongful discharge in California, "indicates that the cove-
nant encompasses more than the just cause requirement implied into
certain at-will employment contracts under Cleary and Pugh." 7 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cancellier v. Federated
Department Stores, 17 4 an action based on age discrimination, held
that under California law claims for breaches of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing "sound in both contract and tort and
may give rise to emotional distress damages and punitive damages." 175
B. The Public Policy Exception
An exception to the employment-at-will rule based on consider-
ations of public policy continues to be recognized in only a limited
number of jurisdictions. 17 Under this exception, recovery in tort has
172. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 179 n.12, 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 846
n. 12 (1980). In Tameny plaintiff was allegedly discharged for refusing to participate
in an illegal gas price-fixing scheme. The court recognized the propriety of a tort
remedy for discharges in contravention of public policy. Id. at 176, 610 P.2d at 1335,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
173. 537 F. Supp. at 1078. The court also held that the plaintiff did not have a
cause of action for wrongful discharge against a vice president of the defendant as an
individual, because the vice president had acted within his scope of employment. Id.
at 1080.
174. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff also raised a claim for age
discrimination under the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(1976). The court held that the ADEA did not preempt the award of
tort damages on the plaintiff's state law claim for breach of the "good faith" condi-
tion. 672 F.2d at 1318.
175. Id.
176. The following jurisdictions have recognized public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will rule: California: Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d
167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Connecticut: Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Florida: Smith v. Piezo
Technology & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983); Hawaii: Parnar v. American
Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982); Illinois: Palmateer v. International Har-
vester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Indiana: Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Kansas: Murphy v. City of
Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Lab. Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186
(1981); Kentucky: Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, No. 81-2460 (Ky. Ct.
App. Nov. 12, 1982); Maryland: Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432
A.2d 464 (1981), modified, 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982); Massachusetts: Cort v.
Bristol-Myers Co., 385 Mass. 300, 431 N.E.2d 908 (1982); Michigan: Sventko v.
Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Montana: Nye v. Depart-
ment of Livestock, 639 P.2d 498 (Mont. 1982); New Hampshire: Cloutier v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981); New Jersey: Lally v.
Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Oregon: Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or.
210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Pennsylvania: Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); West Virginia: Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289
S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982); Wisconsin: Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d
44, 325 N.W.2d 70 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (petition for review pending) (dicta).
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been allowed for employees discharged in violation of a "clear man-
date of public policy." 7 7 The "Achilles heel" of the exception, how-
ever, is in determining what constitutes "public policy.' 78 Courts,
without reaching an accord on a standard definition of the term, have
relied on both statutory17 9 and non-statutory 180 sources to determine
the public policy limitations on the rights of employers to dismiss
employees summarily. 1" Nevertheless, certain jurisdictions have de-
177. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981); Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316
N.W.2d 710 (1982); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982); but see Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H.
915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) ("strong and clear public policy" is not required).
In Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980), petition
for appeal denied, (1981), a more liberal statement of the law of wrongful discharge
was set forth requiring a court to "weigh several factors, balancing against [the
employee's] interest in making a living, his employer's interest in running its business,
its motive in discharging [the employee] and its manner of effecting the discharge,
and any social interests or public policies that may be implicated in the discharge."
Id. at 577, 422 A.2d at 620. The Yaindl balancing test was rejected in Boresen v.
Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1230, 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1981), as representing the
trend of the law in Pennsylvania on wrongful terminations.
178. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d
876, 878 (1981).
179. See, e.g., Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, No. 81-2460 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12,
1982); Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981).
180. See, e.g., Nye v. Department of Livestock, 639 P.2d 498 (Mont. 1982)
(administrative personnel policy rules); Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J.
Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (code of ethics); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (general public good).
181. In Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980),
the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated:
The sources of public policy include legislation; administrative rules, regu-
lations or decisions; or judicial decisions. In certain instances, a profes-
sional code of ethics may contain an expression of public policy. However,
not all such sources express a clear mandate of public policy. For example,
a code of ethics designed to serve only the interests of a profession or an
administrative regulation concerned with technical matters probably
would not be sufficient. Absent legislation, the judiciary must define the
cause of action in case-by-case determinations.
Id. at 72, 417 A.2d at 512.
Another definition of the phrase "public policy" was set forth by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981), as follows:
There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that
public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens
of the State collectively. It is to be found in the State's constitution and
statutes and, when they are silent, in its judicial decisions. . . .Although
there is no precise line of demarcation dividing matters that are the subject
of public policies from matters purely personal, a survey of cases in other
States involving retaliatory discharges shows that a matter must strike at
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dined to apply the public policy exception to retaliatory or abusive
discharges covered by "full and adequate" statutory remedies. 82
1. Retaliatory Discharges
Under the public policy exception, employees may have a cause of
action in tort for discharges made in retaliation for exercising a statu-
tory right; 183 for refusing to violate the law; 84 and for furthering a
public interest to the detriment of their employers.185 Employees dis-
charged on grounds prohibited by statute 181 or condemned by general
public policy considerations 87 may also have a claim for abusive
discharge. The public policy exception, however, does not cover mat-
ters which are personal or sheerly speculative as to the public policies
involved.
Recent cases demonstrate that there is a definite trend toward
limiting the public policy exception to violations of clear mandates of
the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the
tort will be allowed.
Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (citation omitted).
182. Parets v. Eaton Corp., 479 F. Supp. 512, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1979); accord
Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982); Carrillo v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
183. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(refusing to take a polygraph test); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, No. 81-
2460 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982) (filing workers' compensation claim).
184. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330,
164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (refusal to participate in illegal gas price-fixing scheme);
O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978)
(refusal to administer improper medical treatment); Petermann v. International
Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1959)
(refusal to commit perjury before legislative committee); see also National Steel Is
Told to Pay Fired Worker $850,000 Plus Interest, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1983, at 58,
col. 2 (employee discharged for "refusing to use irregular methods in reporting
expenses for American Steel and some of its executives.").
185. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1982) (protesting hazardous working conditions caused by cigarette smoking); Petrik
v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (threatening
to report alleged embezzlement of corporate funds); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams,
Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (serving on jury against employer's
wishes).
186. See, e.g., Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (discharge based on results of polygraph examination); McKinney v. National
Dairy Council, 491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (discharge based on age); Horri-
gan v. General Motors Corp., No. 77-3302-Z (D. Mass. July 23, 1980) (discharge to
prevent imminent accrual of retirement benefits).
187. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421
N.E.2d 876 (1981) (public policy favoring citizen crime-fighters); Cloutier v. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 121 N.H. 915, 436 A.2d 1140 (1981) (protecting the safety of
other employees).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
public policy. 188 Claims for retaliatory discharge, therefore, have been
denied where an employee's dismissal could only be characterized as
"unfair"; 189 where only "sheer speculation" supported an employee's
claim that he was terminated for refusing to lie during an employment
discrimination investigation; 190 where an employee did not allege that
he was fired for exercising a specific right or duty; 191 and where
employees had no statutory right or obligation to object to certain
alleged illegal price discounts and promotional allowances for favored
customers. 92 Similarly, no violation of public policy was found in
cases where an employee's complaint concerning internal company
accounting practices only involved a corporate management dis-
pute, 93 and where an employee merely complained about the ade-
quacy of customer service and maintenance of company machines.19 4
The scope of the class of employees protected by the public policy
exception has also been the subject of recent judicial scrutiny. Several
Illinois decisions demonstrate that it is still unclear as to whether
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements or other em-
ployment contracts can have a cause of action in tort for retaliatory
discharges. In Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.1 5 an Illinois appellate
court held that an employee discharged in retaliation for filing a
workmen's compensation claim was limited to his contractual reme-
dies under an applicable collective bargaining agreement and could
not sue in tort for retaliatory discharge. 19 A similar result was reached
188. See, e.g., Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50
(1980) (no cause of action for retaliatory discharge where nurse was terminated for
leaking alleged patient abuse and other improprieties to newspapers); Campbell v.
Eli Lilly Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980), petitionfor transfer denied, 421
N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. 1981) (no exception to at-will rule for reporting to company
counsel certain supervisory misconduct in collecting and reporting drug safety data);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980) (Hippocratic
Oath did not contain clear mandate of public policy preventing doctor from perform-
ing research on controversial drug).
189. Boresen v. Rohm & Haas, Inc., 526 F. Supp. 1230, 1235-36 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
190. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 109 Wis. 2d 44, 49, 325 N.W.2d 70, 73
(Ct. App. 1982) (petition for review pending).
191. Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982).
192. Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982); accord
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (employee discharged for
allegedly refusing to violate antitrust laws did not have standing to challenge viola-
tions of these laws).
193. Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710
(1982).
194. Keneally v. Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980).
195. 85 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980).
196. The court held that the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), adopting the public policy
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in Pinsoj v. Pinsof'17 where a claim for retaliatory discharge was
dismissed for an employee who did not specifically allege that his
employment relationship was in fact terminable at-will.19 8
Nevertheless, the holding of Cook was directly rejected by another
Illinois appellate court in Wyatt v. Jewel Companies, Inc."" In Wyatt
it was held that an employee discharged in retaliation for filing a
worker's compensation claim could sue in tort for damages, even
though his employment was subject to the grievance-resolution mech-
anisms of a collective bargaining agreement.2 00 State "whistle-blower"
legislation also appears to afford protection from retaliatory dis-
charges for all employees regardless of the availability of contractual
remedies.2 0 '
The issue of whether individual liability for retaliatory discharges
can be imposed on the corporate officials responsible for the wrongful
termination has been a source of recent debate. In Harless v. First
National Bank202 the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held
exception, is not applicable when an employee "has recourse against an employer
under a collective bargaining agreement permitting discharge only for just cause and
allowing for arbitration to guarantee the parties' rights." 85 I11. App. 3d at 406, 407
N.E.2d at 98. The Cook court also stated that to permit the grievance resolution
procedures to be circumvented would be an unnecessary invitation to industrial
strife. Id., 407 N.E.2d at 99; accord Bates v. Jim Walther Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d
903 (Ala. 1982); Embry v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 62 Or. App. 113, 659
P.2d 436 (1983). See also Harrison v. Fred S. James, P.A., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 438
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (under Pennsylvania law, at-will status required to maintain action
for abusive discharge).
197. 107 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d 525 (1982).
198. Plaintiff alleged that he had a contract for lifetime employment based on
certain death benefit and stoqk purchase agreements. The court denied his cause of
action for breach of this alleged contract and, presumably in the alternative, his
cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Id. at 1035, 438 N.E.2d at 527.
199. 108 Ill. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982); but see Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp., 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (retaliatory discharge
requires at-will status) (citing Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d
124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)).
200. Contrary to the holding in Cook, the Wyatt court held that under Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), an employee could seek to
recover both contract and tort damages for a retaliatory discharge in violation of the
state workers' compensation law. The Wyatt court also held that an employee is not
required to exhaust his contractual remedies prior to commencing a suit in tort for
wrongful termination. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 841, 439 N.E.2d at 1054.
201. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text. These laws also provide that
the rights of employees under applicable collective bargaining agreements are not
impaired; see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.366 (West 1981); 1982 Conn. Legis.
Serv. 1056 (West).
202. 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982). Plaintiff-employee was discharged for at-
tempting to have the defendant-employer comply with state and federal consumer
credit protection laws. See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978).
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that a supervisor who had been the "principal protagonist" in obtain-
ing the plaintiffs dismissal could be held personally liable in tort for
the retaliatory discharge, even though he did not actually fire the
plaintiff and was acting within the scope of his authority. 20 3 A federal
court in Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. ,204 applying California
law, reached a different conclusion, by holding that a vice president
acting within the scope of his employment and not for any individual
advantage could not be sued in tort for wrongfully inducing the
breach of the plaintiff's at-will employment relationship.20 5 The fed-
eral court distinguished the decisions in the California cases of Cleary
v. American Airlines, Inc.20 8 and Mayes v. Sturdy Northern Sales,
Inc.20 7 where causes of action for wrongful terminations were sus-
tained against individual defendants not acting within the scope of
their employment as agents of the corporation.2 08
2. Recent Cases
Various sources of public policy have been relied on in recent cases
to support a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. 209 These cases
demonstrate that federal and state statutes continue to provide the
main source of public policy for wrongful terminations. Courts have
implied private causes of action under statutory measures for employ-
ees discharged in retaliation for exercising a legal right or for refusing
to violate the law.2 10 In Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc.211 the Su-
preme Court of Hawaii recently adopted the public policy exception
to protect an employee who was summarily discharged to induce her
to leave the jurisdiction in order to prevent her from testifying before
a grand jury investigating alleged antitrust violations by the defend-
ant. "Whistle-blower" protection has also been provided in some
203. 289 S.E.2d at 698-99. The court noted that "[i]n a retaliatory discharge case
the person who does the actual firing may have little to do with the underlying
controversy." Id. (footnote omitted). See also Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 285 S.E.2d
679 (W. Va. 1981) (two-year statute of limitations placed on retaliatory discharge
cases in West Virginia).
204. 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982); see notes 170-73 supra for a further
discussion of this case.
205. 537 F. Supp. at 1080.
206. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980); see notes 165-66 supra and
accompanying text for a discussion of Cleary.
207. 91 Cal. App. 3d 69, 154 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1979); see notes 332-41 infra for a
discussion of tortious interference with contractual relations.
208. 537 F. Supp. at 1080.
209. See note 181 supra for a discussion of public policy sources.
210. See notes 213-17 & 219-25 infra and accompanying text.
211. 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982).
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jurisdictions for employees discharged for reporting alleged violations
of statutory measures designed to safeguard the health and welfare of
the general public.2 12
Implied causes of action under state workers' compensation acts for
retaliatory discharges continue to be recognized under the public
policy exception. 21 3 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Firestone
Textile Co. Division v. Meadows214, recently adopted the public policy
exception in order to protect an employee who alleged that he "had
been terminated solely because he had sought and obtained workers'
compensation for an injury which he suffered in the course of his
employment .. 1.. ,,25 Like certain other jurisdictions, the Kentucky
Workers' Compensation Act 218 did not contain any "provision specifi-
cally restricting an employer from discharging an employee for the
latter's exercise of his rights thereunder. '" 21 7 Other courts, however,
have declined to adopt or apply the public policy exception to employ-
ees statutorily protected from discharge for exercising their rights
under applicable state workers' compensation law on the grounds that
it was the function of the legislature to establish a remedy for such
terminations. 218
212. See notes 219-25 infra and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Smith v. Piezo Technology & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla.
1983); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of
Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Lab. Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186
(1981); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or.
597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978). See also Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d
59, 174 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981) (publication of opinion withdrawn) (contrary to other
California decisions, court sustained retaliatory discharge cause of action for filing
workers' compensation claim).
214. No. 81-2460 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982).
215. Id. at 1.
216. Ky. REV. STAT. ch. 342 (1983). The court noted that the Kentucky statute
"does plainly exhibit a policy that employees should be free to accept or reject
coverage without coercion by their employers, . . . and that they should not be
deceived into foregoing lawful claims for benefits or into accepting less than is due
them." No. 81-246, slip op. at 4-5 (citations omitted) (citing Ky. REV. STAT. §§
342.395, 342.335 (1983)).
217. No. 81-246, slip op. at 4.
218. See, e.g., Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.) (Mississippi
law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.
2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992
(1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 215, cert.
denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978). The decision in Dockery was subse-
quently superseded by statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-6.1 (1979). See also Wright
v. Fiber Indus., 299 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. App. 1983).
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"Whistle-blower" protection under the public policy exception has
been afforded in recent decisions to employees who merely threatened
to report or only reported to company officials alleged violations of
federal or state law. In Adler v. American Standard Corp. 219 for
example, a federal district court, applying Maryland law, sustained a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge on behalf of an employee who
alleged that he was terminated for threatening to disclose certain
illegal activities, including "the payment of commercial bribes and the
falsification of corporate records and financial statistics. ' 220 An Illi-
nois appellate court in Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.221 similarly
sustained a wrongful discharge claim on behalf of an employee who
alleged that he was dismissed in retaliation for reporting his suspicions
of the embezzlement of corporate funds to company officials.2 22 The
Petrik court rejected the defendant's contention that the decision of
the Supreme Court of Illinois in Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co.22 3 required the actual notification of public authorities of alleged
violations of the law in order to sustain a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge. 224 Similarly, other jurisdictions have also not required the
219. 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982). Prior to rendering its decision, the federal
court referred the following questions to the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
(1) Is a cause of action for "abusive discharge" recognized under the
substantive law of the State of Maryland?
(2) Do the allegations of the amended complaint, if taken as true, state a
cause of action for "abusive discharge" under the substantive law of the
State of Maryland?
Id. at 575. The Maryland court in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md.
31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), adopted the public policy exception, but held that the
plaintiff's allegations were "too general, too conclusory, too vague and lacking in
specifics ...." Id. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471. The plaintiff subsequently filed a second
amended complaint in federal court enumerating a number of federal and state
statutes which formed the basis of his retaliatory discharge action. 538 F. Supp. at
575.
220. 291 Md. at 44, 432 A.2d at 471. The laws relied on by the plaintiff to support
his allegations were federal and state antitrust laws, federal and state tax laws, the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. V 1981), and
federal law concerning fraudulent acts against the United States Treasury, 26 U.S.C.
§§ 7201, 7206 (Supp. V 1981) (fraud against the IRS). See 538 F. Supp. at 578.
221. 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982).
222. Id. at 508-09, 444 N.E.2d at 592-98. The plaintiff initially discovered a
$130,000 discrepancy in the defendant's financial books and records and immediately
informed the defendant's president and chief operating officer. Plaintiff, at the
request of the defendant's president, conducted a further investigation of the matter
which revealed that certain officers or employees of the defendant " 'might be
involved in violation of the criminal laws of Illinois.' " Id. at 503, 444 N.E.2d at 589.
After reporting these findings, plaintiff alleged that he was discharged by the defend-
ant's vice president and treasurer. Id. at 504, 444 N.E.2d at 589.
223. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
224. 111 Ill. App. 3d at 507-08, 444 N.E.2d at 542.
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actual notification of public authorities as a prerequisite to the grant-
ing of "whistle-blower" protection. 2 5
A professional code of ethics was recognized in the New Jersey case
of Kalman v. Grand Union Co. 22 as a viable source of public policy
under the retaliatory discharge doctrine. The plaintiff-pharmacist in
Kalman was allegedly dismissed for ensuring that a pharmacist was on
duty while the defendant's store was open in accordance with the
requirements of state law 22 7 and the provisions of the Code of Ethics
of the American Pharmaceutical Association. 228 In sustaining the
plaintiff's claim for retaliatory discharge, the court distinguished the
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Pierce v. Ortho Pharma-
ceutical Corp.229 on the grounds that the pharmaceutical code of
ethics, unlike the Hippocratic Oath in Pierce, coincided with the
public policy. 230 Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have rejected
the use of professional codes of ethics as sources of public policy in
wrongful discharge cases. 231
3. Exclusivity of Remedy
The issue of whether statutory remedies provide the exclusive relief
for retaliatory discharges made in violation of applicable federal and
225. See, e.g., Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md.
1982); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
226. 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
227. Plaintiff relied on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:14-30 to 45:14-33 (West 1978), as
support for his claims. Under the provisions of this law, "both parties concede[d] that
a registered pharmacist had to be on duty whenever the store was open, and the
pharmacy area could not be closed while the rest of the premises were open." 183
N.J. Super. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730.
228. The code of ethics provided in pertinent part:
A PHARMACIST has the duty to observe the law, to uphold the dignity
and honor of the profession, and to accept its ethical principles. He should
not engage in any activity that will bring discredit to the profession and
should expose, without fear or favor, illegal or unethical conduct in the
profession.
183 N.J. Super. at 158, 443 A.2d at 730 (emphasis in original).
229. 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980). In Pierce the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a doctor who was discharged for refusing to perform research on a contro-
versial drug did not have a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, because there
was no clear mandate in the Hippocratic Oath preventing her from performing her
assignment.
230. 183 N.J. Super. at 159, 443 A.2d at 730 ("We have no doubt that plaintiff
was required by this code to report defendant's attempt to flout state regulations.").
231. See, e.g., Suchodolski v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316
N.W.2d 710 (1982); see generally Comment, Discharge of Professional Employees:
Protecting Against Dismissal For Acts Within A Professional Code of Ethics, 11
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 149 (1979-1980). A bill (S. 4937; A. 6610) to amend the
New York Labor Law was passed and submitted to the Governor by the New York
1983]
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state laws continues to be a source of judicial debate. The essential
elements in determining the exclusivity of statutory remedies include
the preexistence of a common law right, the express language and
purpose of that statute, legislative intent, and the completeness of the
statutory relief. In the absence of statutory remedies, courts will
decide whether an implied private right of action under the statute in
question exists.
It is generally agreed that "when a statute creates a new right or
imposes a new duty having no counterpart in the common law the
remedies provided in the statute for violation are exclusive and not
cumulative. ' 232 Employees, therefore, must exhaust their administra-
tive remedies prior to seeking judicial relief.2 33 Exceptions to the
general rule, however, are permitted where the statutory remedies are
not intended to be exclusive.234
Recent cases demonstrate that a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge will not exist where applicable statutory remedies are con-
strued to be exclusive based on the absence of preexisting common law
rights. 235 In Ohlsen v. DST Industries2 36 a Michigan appellate court
held that the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act
(MIOSHA)2 37 provided the exclusive remedy for an at-will employee
alleged to have been terminated for refusing to work in an unsafe
environment. The Ohlsen court distinguished Sventko v. Kroger
Co.,238 where a cause of action for retaliatory discharge was recog-
nized under the Michigan workers' compensation law, on the grounds
Legislature in 1983 to protect certain licensed professional employees against retalia-
tory discharges or other punitive action for refusing to engage in "professional
misconduct" as defined in N.Y. EDUC. LAW. §§ 6506, 6509, 6509-a (McKinney 1972
& Supp. 1982-83).
232. Ohlsen v. DST Indus., 111 Mich. App. 580, 583, 314 N.W.2d 699, 701
(1981) (citing Pompey v. General Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 189 N.W.2d 243
(1971)). Accord Portillo v. G.T. Price Prods., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 291 (1982).
233. See, e.g., Butz v. Hertz Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Schwartz
v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W2d 459 (1981).
234. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1982); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v. Trans-
con Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
235. See, e.g., Dadas v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 529 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio
1981); McCabe v. City of Eureka, Mo., 500 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 664
F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1981); Portillo v. G.T. Price Prods., Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285,
182 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982); Ohlsen v. DST Indus., 111 Mich. App. 580, 314 N.W.2d
699 (1981).
236. 111 Mich. App. 580, 314 N.W.2d 699 (1981).
237. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.1001 to 408.1069 (Supp. 1982-1983). Plain-
tiff alleged he was discharged for exercising his rights under MIOSHA to protest an
unsafe work place. The plaintiff alleged that the assignment of another truck driver
with a suspected alcohol abuse problem to work with him on a routine assignment
created the hazard. 111 Mich. App. at 582, 314 N.W.2d at 700.
238. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
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that the statute in Sventko, unlike MIOSHA, contained no express
remedies. 23  The exclusivity of MIOSHA was also confirmed in
Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co.240
The exclusivity of statutory relief for employment discrimination
under federal and state law has been recognized in recent decisions.2 4'
In Brudnicki v. General Electric Co.242 a federal district court, apply-
ing Illinois law, stated that "the remedies provided by state and
federal law would have no meaning," if an independent common law
action for retaliatory discharge could be maintained on public policies
protected by these employment discrimination laws. 243 Similarly, in
Carrillo v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. ,244 a federal district court de-
clined to exercise pendent jurisdiction2 45 over a retaliatory discharge
claim on the ground that "the very completeness of the statutory
remedies for employment discrimination that are codified in the [Illi-
nois] Human Rights Act ... argue against the application of the tort
to employment discrimination cases. ' '2 46 The Court of Appeals for the
239. 111 Mich. App. at 585-86, 314 N.W.2d at 702 ("The Sventko decision does
not extend to this case where the statute involved prohibits retaliatory discharge and
provides an exclusive remedy.").
240. 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981). The plaintiff in Schwartz
alleged that he was discharged based on his effective performance as a safety director
in enforcing MIOSHA regulations. The court dismissed this cause of action, because
plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
relief. Id. at 480, 308 N.W.2d at 463.
241. See, e.g., Bruffett v. Warner Communications, Inc., 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir.
1982); Zywick v. Moxness Prods., Inc., 31 EMPL. PR~c. DEC. (CCH) 33,340 (E.D.
Wis. 1983); Butz v. Hertz Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Carrillo v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 538 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Brudnicki v. General Elec.
Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Dadas v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 529 F.
Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
242. 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Plaintiff claimed he was discharged "in
retaliation for his resistance to pressure from G.E. to hire and promote female
employees solely on the basis of sex." Id. at 88.
243. 'Id. at 89. The court limited the holding of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), to cases where "there was no other remedy available to
vindicate the public policy involved." 535 F. Supp. at 89.
244. 538 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Plaintiff, a Hispanic female, alleged
unlawful discrimination based on sex, race and national origin. Id. at 795.
245. Federal courts are empowered to hear pendent state claims arising out of a
"common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966). The discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction depends on "consider-
ations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Id.
246. 538 F. Supp. at 799. The court declined to resolve the issue of whether the
Illinois state courts would apply the tort of retaliatory discharge to the facts of this
case. In this regard, the court stated: "Were this court to exercise pendent jurisdiction
over [plaintiff's] state claims, it would be necessary to resolve novel and complex
issues of state law." Id.
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Third Circuit in Brufjett v. Warner Communications, Inc.2 47 reached
the same conclusion in narrowly construing the provisions of the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Act (PHRA) 248 which provide that "the
procedure herein provided shall, when invoked, be exclusive and the
final determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or
criminal, based on the same grievance of the complainant con-
cerned."249
Other courts have recognized that an implied private cause of
action for retaliatory discharge may be available as an alternative
source of relief to statutory remedies, even in the absence of a preexist-
ing common law rights. 250 In Lally v. Copygraphics,2 5 1 for example,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, without indicating whether preex-
isting common law rights existed, held that a claim for retaliatory
discharge could be maintained to augment available penal and ad-
247. 692 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1982). Plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to offer
him permanent employment because he was a diabetic. He, therefore, alleged un-
lawful discrimination claims based on handicap or disability under the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-962(b) (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1982-1983), and the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 692 F.2d at 912.
248. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 955, 962(b) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1982-1983).
249. Id. § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Fye v. Central Transp. Inc., 487 Pa. 137, 409 A.2d 2 (1979), held that the remedies
of the PHRA are exclusive for those individuals who invoke the provisions of the
statute. Accord Butz v. Hertz Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (once
employee filed complaint for age discrimination with state agency, PHRA became
exclusive remedy); but see Bonham v. Dresser Indus., 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (PHRA is exclusive remedy whether or not in-
voked). Even though the plaintiff in Bruffett had not in fact invoked the provisions of
the PHRA, the court refused to infer a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under
Pennsylvania law for a refusal to hire based on handicap or disability. 692 F.2d at
920-22. See also Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1052 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (no
breach of contract action under PHRA); contra McGinley v. Burroughs Corp., 407
F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (breach of contract action upheld under PHRA).
250. See, e.g., Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 547 F. Supp. 54 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (discharge based on results of polygraph examination); Shaw v. Russell Truck-
ing Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (private right of action recognized
under Clayton Act); Berry v. Andrews, 535 F. Supp. 1317 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (private
right of action under Service Contract Act); McKinney v. National Dairy Council,
491 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1980) (dismissal based on age); Meyer v. Byron Jackson,
Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 59, 174 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1981) (publication of opinion
withdrawn) (contrary to other California decisions, court held that discharge in
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claim stated cause of action); Lally v.
Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (retaliatory discharge for filing
workers' compensation claim); see cases cited in notes 295-99 infra for an interpreta-
tion of New York law by federal courts prior to the rejection of the public policy
exception in Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1983).
251. 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981).
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ministrative remedies under the state workers' compensation law.
Declining to address the "adequacy" of the administrative remedies,
the Lally court still held that "[a] common law action for wrongful
discharge in this context will effectuate statutory objectives and com-
plement the legislative and administrative policies which undergrid
the workers' compensation laws. ' 252 In Cancellier v. Federated De-
partment Stores253 the Ninth Circuit held that the ADEA did not
preempt an award of tort damages on pendent state claims which did
not duplicate the federal statutory relief.
Courts have also allowed causes of action for retaliatory discharges
based on a preexisting common law right which was not preempted
by the passage of applicable statutory relief. In this regard, it has been
held that "where a statutory remedy is provided for the enforcement
of a preexisting common-law right, the newer statutory remedy will
be considered only cumulative. ' 254 In Brown v. Transcon Lines2 55 the
Supreme Court of Oregon held that a preexisting cause of action for
retaliatory discharge was not, in the absence of an express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary, abrogated or superseded by the
implementation of administrative remedies under the state workers'
compensation law. 256 A similar result was reached in Hentzel v. Singer
Co. 257 where a California appellate court held that the remedial
provisions of the California Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1973258 did not abolish the common law rights of an employee alleg-
edly discharged in retaliation for protesting the "hazardous working
conditions" caused by the cigarette smoking of other employees in the
workplace. 259
In the absence of express statutory remedies, courts have deter-
mined whether implied private rights of action can exist under federal
and state law. The factors deemed relevant to such an inquiry under
252. Id. at 671, 428 A.2d at 1318 ("If the Legislature had wanted to foreclose a
judicial cause of action, it would have done so expressly."). Id., 428 A.2d at 319. See
also Bryant v. Dayton Casket Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 367, 433 N.E.2d 142 (1982) (mere
expression of intent to pursue workers' compensation benefits prior to discharge did
not state cause of action under statutory provision).
253. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 131 (1982).
254. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 303, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 168
(1982) (emphasis in original); accord Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588
P.2d 1087 (1978).
255. 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
256. Id. at 610-11, 588 P.2d at 1093-95. The court in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210,
536 P.2d 512 (1975), had adopted the public policy exception to protect an employee
who was discharged for serving on a jury.
257. 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982).
258. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6310-6312 (West Supp. 1983).
259. 138 Cal. App. 3d at 303, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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federal statutes were enumerated by the United States Supreme Court
in Cort v. Ash. 260 Under the Cort standards, when determining
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, courts
should consider the " 'language and focus of the statute, its legislative
history, and its purpose' " as well as "whether the cause of action is
'one traditionally relegated to state law.' "261 In analyzing state law,
courts have similarly relied on the language and purpose of the stat-
ute, including its legislative history, in determining whether a claim
for wrongful termination can be maintained. 22
Retaliatory discharge cases arising under state workers' compensa-
tion laws without express statutory remedies are most illustrative of
the types of private rights which will be implied under state law. The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Mead-
ows 2 63 recently adopted the public policy exception to protect an
employee allegedly dismissed in retaliation for filing a claim under the
state workers' compensation law which did not provide protection
against such discriminatory acts. Prior to this decision, courts in Indi-
ana, 26 4 Michigan, 26 5 Illinois,266 and Kansas267 had recognized an im-
plied right of action for retaliatory discharge under state workers'
compensation acts similarly without express statutory remedies. Pri-
vate rights of action, however, have not been implied, even in the
absence of statutory remedies, under OSHA;2 6 1 other state workers'
260. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The Cort standards were reviewed further by the Su-
preme Court in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630 (1981). See generally Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal
Statutes: Congressional Intent, Judicial Defense, or Mutual Abdication?, 50 ForD-
HAM L. REV. 611 (1982).
261. Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770-71 n.21 (1981)
(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). See Smith v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612
F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980) (implied private cause of
action recognized to protect seaman-employee for exercising his rights under the
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688).
262. See, e.g., Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290, 188 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1982); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978).
263. No. 81-2460 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982). Accord Smith v. Piezo Technol-
ogy & Prof. Adm'rs, 427 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1983).
264. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
265. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
266. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
267. Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Lab. Servs., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981).
268. Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. Consoli-
dated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977); see also McCarthy v.
Bark Peking, 676 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1982) (no need to reach private cause of action
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compensation laws; 2 69 federal and state equal employment statutes; 270
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 271 and the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. 72
V. Adherence to the Employment-at-Will Rule
Courts continue to adhere to the rule that employment relationships
of an indefinite duration may be terminated at any time without
notice "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally
wrong. ... 273 The reluctance of certain jurisdictions to adopt excep-
tions to the at-will rule, in the absence of a legislative mandate, is
demonstratedby recent decisions. Aside from the apparent difficulties
in defining public policy, courts are wary of becoming in effect the
legislators of such policy by formulating exceptions to the at-will
rule.2 74 Similarly, courts have declined to imply the "good faith"
issue where administrative remedies were exhausted under OSHA), vacated on other
grounds, 103 S. Ct. 809 (1983) (remanded for further consideration in light of
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini N. River Ass'n, 103 S.
Ct. 63 (1983)).
269. Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.) (Mississippi law),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980); Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978);
Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); cf. Stephens v. Justiss-
Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (discharge of rehired employee
nine months after he filed workers' compensation claim was not unlawful); Hudson
v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979) (no cause of action to
recover damages for mental distress allegedly caused by retaliatory discharge for
filing workers' compensation claim).
270. Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Dadas v.
Prescott, Ball & Turben, 529 F. Supp. 203 (N.D. Ohio 1981); McCluney v. Jos.
Schlitz Brewing Co., 489 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
271. Hoopes v. Equifax, Inc., 611 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979).
272. LeVick v. Skaggs Cos., 701 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1983); McCabe v. City of
Eureka, 500 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 644 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1981); but
see Ellis v. Clover & Gardner Constr. Co., No. 80-3726 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 1983)
(private right of action recognized).
273. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915).
274. See, e.g., Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 794, 635 P.2d 992,
997 (1981) ("The wisdom of adopting the relief advocated ...is best evaluated by
the legislative branch and the determination of the appropriate format for such
proposed legislative change, if any, is best weighed by the legislature."); Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 302, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 235 (1983)
("Both of these aspects of the issue, involving perception and declaration of relevant
public policy ... are best and more appropriately explored and resolved by the
legislative branch of our government.") (citation omitted); see cases cited in note 292
infra.
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condition into at-will employment relationships, thereby subjecting
further "uncertainty" into these relationships.
2 75
A. Rejection of the "Good Faith" Condition
A number of jurisdictions have declined to recognize the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment-at-will con-
tracts.2 76 Refusing to follow the rationale of Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co. 277 and Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 27 8 the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in Parnar v. American Hotels, Inc. ,279 stated:
Like the court in Monge, we "cannot ignore the new climate
prevailing generally in the relationship of employer and em-
ployee." Nor can we discount the trend to submit the employer's
power of discharge to closer judicial scrutiny in appropriate cir-
cumstances. But to imply into each employment contract a duty to
terminate in good faith would seem to subject each discharge to
judicial incursions into the amorphous concept of bad faith. We are
not persuaded that protection of employees requires such an intru-
sion on the employment relationship or such an imposition on the
courts.
28 0
An implied duty of fair dealing has also been rejected in at-will
employment relationships under federal statutory and case law.28'
275. See, e.g., Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) ("A basic function of the law is to foster certainty in business
relationships, not to create uncertainty by establishing ambivalent criteria for the
construction of [employment] relationships.").
276. See, e.g., Butz v. Hertz Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (federal
statutory and common law); Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487
(W.D. Ark. 1982) (Arkansas law); Perry v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp.
1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982) (Indiana law); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d
266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625
(Hawaii 1982); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d
459 (1981); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1983).
277. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); see notes 129-31 supra and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Monge.
278. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); see notes 146-49 supra and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Fortune.
279. 652 P.2d 625 (Hawaii 1982). The Parnar court adopted the public policy
exception for the State of Hawaii where plaintiff alleged she was discharged in order
to induce her to leave jurisdiction, thereby preventing her from testifying before a
grand jury investigating antitrust violations. See notes 176-231 supra for a discussion
of the public policy exception.
280. 652 P.2d at 629.
281. Butz v. Hertz Corp., 554 F. Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D. Pa. 1983) ("A general
duty of fair dealing in employment situations does not exist in federal statutory or
case law. Absent a specific federal law to the contrary, business people may conduct
their affairs as they desire, whether they be fair or unfair.").
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The most extensive debate on the rejection of the implied "good
faith" condition is found in Murphy v. American Home Products
Corp.2 182 In this case, the New York Court of Appeals was confronted
with the issue, as one of five causes of action,2 8 3 of whether plaintiff's
claim that he was summarily discharged in retaliation for reporting
certain alleged accounting improprieties to defendant's officials, as
required by internal company regulations, constituted a breach of his
at-will employment contract. The court perceived the issue as one
founded on the recognition of the "good faith" condition rather than
on the implied "just cause" standard recognized in other cases. 28 4 Even
though plaintiff had alleged that he was discharged for performing his
job in accordance with express company regulations, the court, over a
dissenting opinion, declined to apply the "good faith" condition to at-
will employment relationships reasoning that "it would be incongru-
ous to say that an inference may be drawn that the employer im-
pliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his right of
termination. 2 85 The court, therefore, concluded that the recognition
of the implied-in-law obligation of "good faith" as well as the tort of
abusive discharge should be left to the state legislature. 286
The dissent in Murphy argued that there is "no compelling policy
reason to read the implied obligation of good faith out of contracts
282. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983); for a further discussion of this case,
see notes 305-14 infra and accompanying text.
283. Plaintiff also alleged causes of action for abusive discharge; intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress; prima facie tort; and age discrimination under state law.
58 N.Y.2d at 297, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
284. See notes 368-400 infra for a discussion of implied "just cause" conditions in
at-will employment relationships.
285. 58 N.Y.2d at 304-05, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237. The court specifically limited its
holding in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill Co., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457
N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982) based on the "totality" of the parties' relationship, a contractual
right to job security may exist in an at-will employment relationship, to cases involv-
ing an "express limitation" on the rights of employers to discharge employees at-
will. 58 N.Y.2d at 305, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237; for a further discussion of Weiner, see
notes 388-97 infra and accompanying text.
286. 58 N.Y.2d at 305-06 n.2, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 238 n.2. In this regard, the court
stated:
[T]here has been much criticism of the traditional conception of the legal
obligations and rights which attach to an employment at will. It may well
be that in the light of modern economic and social considerations radical
changes should be made. As all of us recognize, however, resolution of the
critical issues turns on identification and balancing of fundamental com-
ponents of public policy. Recognition of an implied-in-law obligation of
good faith as restricting the employer's right to terminate is as much a part
of this matrix as is recognition of the tort action for abusive discharge. We
are of the view that this aggregate of rights and obligations should not be
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impliedly terminable at will. To do so belies the 'universal force' of the
good faith obligation which ... the law reads into 'all contracts.' "2,87
Declining to defer the recognition of the "good faith" condition to the
legislature, the dissent stated that a common law principle such as the
at-will rule "can properly be changed by the courts but, more impor-
tantly, . . . the rule has for at least a century been subject to the
'universal force' of the good faith rule. '28 8 Accordingly, the dismissal
of plaintiff's breach of contract action was viewed as being "wholly
inconsistent" with the longstanding application of the "good faith"
obligation .289
B. Rejection of the Public Policy Exception
The overwhelming number of jurisdictions still have not recognized
the tort of abusive discharge. Although certain jurisdictions have not
specifically rejected the public policy exception when confronted with
this cause of action, 290 currently there is no basis for concluding that
these jurisdictions will abandon the at-will rule. This point is readily
confirmed by the recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in
Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.291 which declined to rec-
ognize the public policy exception in the absence of legislative action.
Like New York, a number of jurisdictions have refused to adopt the
public policy exception in the absence of legislation..2 92
approached piecemeal but should be considered in its totality and then
resolved by the Legislature....
Id. at 306 n.2, 461 N.Y.S. 2d at 238 n.2. See also Bergamini v. Manhattan & Bronx
Surface Transit Operating Authority, No. 15721N (1st Dep't June 21, 1983) (discus-
sion of the applicability of Murphy to public employees).
287. 58 N.Y.2d at 313, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 242 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 314, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (Meyer, J. dissenting); accord Parnar v.
Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Hawaii 1982) ("Because the courts are a
proper forum for modification of the judicially created at-will doctrine, it is appro-
priate that we correct inequities resulting from harsh application of the doctrine by
recognizing its inapplicability in a narrow class of cases.") (footnote omitted).
289. 58 N.Y.2d at 315, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 243 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer
outlined in his dissenting opinion those other areas of the law where the implied
"good faith" condition has been recognized. See id. at 311-13, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
290. See, e.g., Arizona: Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907
(Ct. App. 1977); Colorado: Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App.
465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978); Idaho: Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330,
563 P.2d 54 (1977); Iowa: Abris2 v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454
(Iowa 1978); Nebraska: Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147
(1980); Washington: Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d
764 (1977).
291. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
292. See, e.g., Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981);
Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (1981); Dockery v.
Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 295
N.C. 465, 246 N.E.2d 215 (1978); Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 140 Vt. 114, 435
A.2d 952 (1981).
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1. New York Cases
Prior to Murphy v. American Home Products Corp.,29 3 a number of
federal courts, relying on dicta in Chin v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 2 4 had opined that a cause of action for abusive dis-
charge could exist under New York law where an employee estab-
lished that a public policy of the state had been violated by the
defendant-employer. Causes of action for abusive discharge were,
therefore, sustained by these courts for a discharge based solely on
age; 295 a discharge designed to deprive employees of pension rights; 296
a discharge in retaliation for an employee's refusal to accede to the
preferential hiring and scheduling demands of a union at a hospital; 21
7
and a discharge based on alleged sex, age and national origin discrimi-
nation. 208 A number of other federal court cases, however, dismissed
wrongful termination claims on the ground that New York did not
recognize the tort of abusive discharge for violations of public pol-
icy. 29
Although several trial courts upheld abusive discharge claims on
motions to dismiss, 300 other state courts uniformly agreed that New
York did not recognize the public policy exception. 30 1 In Pavolini v.
293. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
294. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396
N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979). Plaintiff in Chin alleged that he was dis-
charged in retaliation for his political beliefs and associations.
295. Rio v. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 82-3950 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1983); Placos v.
Cosmair, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
296. Hovey v. Lutheran Medical Center, 516 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
297. Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
298. Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Assoc. Merchandising Corp., 551 F. Supp. 544
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
299. See, e.g., Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Boniuk v. New York Medical College, 535 F. Supp. 1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See also
Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (no cause
of action for wrongful discharge under Chin where no public policy identified as
being violated).
300. See, e.g., Marino v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 13838-79 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County June 25, 1981) rev'd in part, N.Y.L.J., June 2, 1983 at 11, col.2 (2d Dep't
1983); Balancio v. American Optical Corp., No. 13229-80 (Sup. Ct. Westchester
County May 21, 1981); see also Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 112 Misc.
2d 507, 447 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified, 88 A.D.2d 870, 451
N.Y.S.2d 770 (1st Dep't 1982), aff'd, No. 35 (N.Y. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1983); Opedal
v. Atlantic Cos., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1972 at 2, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972),
aft'd, 42 A.D.2d 520,, 344 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1st Dep't 1973).
301. See, e.g., Pavolini v. Bard Air Corp., 88 A.D.2d 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d
Dep't 1982); Marinzulich v. National Bank of N. Am., 73 A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d
1014 (1st Dep't 1980); Fletcher v. Greiner, 73 A.D.2d 591, 422 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2d
Dep't 1979); O'Donnell v. Weiser, No. 12089-81 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County July 8,
1982); Ackerman v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., No. 42455-80 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
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Bard Air Corp. ,302 for example, the Appellate Division, Third Depart-
ment, held that an employee allegedly discharged for reporting safety
violations to the Federal Aviation Administration and for refusing to
falsify flight records did not have a cause of action for abusive dis-
charge. In Marinzulich v. National Bank of North America30 3 an
employee did not have an abusive discharge claim for uncovering
evidence of an alleged embezzlement. Similarly, in Fletcher v.
Greiner,30 4 an employee's claim for abusive discharge based on sex
discrimination was dismissed on the grounds that New York did not
recognize this cause of action.
In Murphy v. American Home Products Corp. 30 5 the New York
Court of Appeals confirmed that "[tihis court has not and does not
now recognize a cause of action in tort for abusive or wrongful
discharge of an employee; such recognition must await action of the
Legislature." 306 The court of appeals thereby affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiff's abusive discharge claim by the Appellate Division, First
Department, for his failure to state a cause of action. 30 7 The trial
court, although acknowledging that New York had not yet recognized
the public policy exception, sustained the claim on a motion to dismiss
by declining "to put plaintiff out of court, without at least affording
him the opportunity to avail himself of disclosure procedures. ' 30 8
Plaintiff in Murphy, an at-will employee, had alleged that he was
wrongfully terminated in retaliation for reporting to corporate offi-
cials, as required by internal company regulations, 309 certain account-
Apr. 14, 1981), aff'd without opinion, 85 A.D.2d 937 (1st Dep't 1981), appeal
denied, 56 N.Y.2d 501 (1982).
302. 88 A.D.2d 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d 288 (3d Dep't 1982). It should be noted that the
appeal of this case was scheduled to be argued before the New York Court of Appeals
at the same time as Murphy, but was remanded on jurisdictional grounds to the trial
court for further proceedings.
:303. 73 A.D.2d 886, 423 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1980); accord Edwards v.
Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979),
afJ'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875,
414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
:304. 73 A.D.2d 591, 422 N.Y.S.2d 130 (2d Dep't 1979).
305. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
306. Id. at 297, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
307. 88 A.D.2d 870, 451 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1st Dep't 1982). But see Waldman v.
Englishtown Sportswear Ltd., 460 N.Y.S.2d 552, 556 (1st Dep't 1983) (based on
Chin, "no cause lies for wrongful or abusive discharge absent a showing by plaintiff
that the discharge was in violation of a public policy .... ).
308. 112 Misc. 2d 507, 510, 447 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
309. The defendant's "Master Accounting Manual," according to the plaintiff,
"mandated that he act as a whistle blower with regard to any financial irregularities
committed by defendant's personnel." Brief for Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appel-
lant at 9, Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d
232 (1983).
EMPLOYMENT-A T-WILL RULE
ing improprieties in violation of applicable law 310 designed to give
unwarranted bonuses to high-ranking officials by artificially inflating
the growth in the defendant's income. Plaintiff also alleged that he
was discharged in retaliation for his refusal to engage in the unlawful
activity. 311
Despite these compelling facts, the court summarily dismissed the
plaintiff's cause of action for abusive discharge stating "that such a
significant change in our law is best left to the Legislature." 31 2 In
support of its decision, the court cited various state statutes protecting
employees from discharge for engaging in certain activities3 3 and also
noted that proposed "whistle-blower" legislation was pending before
the New York State Legislature. 31 4
2. Other Recent Decisions
Other jurisdictions have also refused to recognize the public policy
exception in the absence of a legislative mandate. In Kelly v. Missis-
sippi Valley Gas Co. ,315 for example, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
held that an employee discharged in retaliation for filing a claim
under the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Law 31' did not have
a cause of action, even though state law did not protect him against
retaliatory discharges. In declining to adopt the public policy excep-
tion in the absence of a statutory mandate, the court stated that "[t]his
public policy decision is not only proper, but an exclusive, subject for
the Legislature to consider. ' 31 7 Similarly, in Bottifliso v. Hutchison
Fruit Co.,318 the Court of Appeals of New Mexico refused to sustain a
claim for retaliatory discharge under the New Mexico Workmen's
Compensation Act, 319 reasoning that "the issue of whether a new
310. Plaintiff relied on N.Y. PENAL LAW § 175.05(1)-(4) (McKinney 1975 & Supp.
1982-1983), which prohibits the falsification of an enterprise's business records.
311. Plaintiff, who was over 50 years old when he was dismissed, also alleged that
age was a contributing factor to his dismissal in violation of state equal employment
law. 58 N.Y.2d at 298, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 233. With respect to this cause of action, the
court held that the plaintiff had timely filed a complaint for age discrimination based
on the three-year statute of limitations of the N.Y. Civ. Prec. LAW § 214(2) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1982-1983) and not the one-year period of N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297(5)
(McKinney 1982). The court limited the application of the one-year period to actions
commenced before the New York State Human Rights Commission. The plaintiff's
age discrimination claim was, therefore, reinstated. 58 N.Y.2d at 306-07, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 238-39.
312. 58 N.Y.2d at 301. 461 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
313. Id. at 302-03 n.1, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236 n.1.
314. See note 89 supra for the provisions of this bill.
315. 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
316. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-1 to 71-3-13 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
317. 397 So. 2d at 877 (footnotes omitted).
318. 96 N.M. 789, 635 P.2d 992 (1981).
319. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-1 to 52-1-69 (1978).
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cause of action should be recognized in this state for retaliatory dis-
missal is more appropriately addressed to the state legislature than to
the judiciary. '" ' 20
Furthermore, "whistle-blower" protection has been denied to at-
will employees in the absence of statutory protection. In Maus v.
National Living Centers, Inc.32 1 a Texas appellate court declined to
infer from state nursing home legislation protection from retaliatory
discharge for a nurse who complained to her superiors that patients
were being neglected and receiving poor care. In Taylor v. Foremost-
McKesson, Inc.322 an employee allegedly terminated in an attempt to
cover up certain accounting irregularities and other illegal activities
by corporate officials was similarly not protected under Georgia law.
Noting that the Georgia courts have declined to adopt a common law
exception to the statutory codification of the at-will rule, 323 the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.
VI. Other Theories of Recovery
In addition to the public policy exception, courts in wrongful dis-
charge cases have considered causes of action in tort for fraud, 32 4
negligence, 325 intentional and negligent infliction of severe emotional
distress, 326 prima facie tort, 327 defamation, 328 and tortious interference
320. 96 N.M. at 794-95, 635 P.2d at 997-98.
321. 633 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
322. 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981).
323. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-7-1 (1982).
324. See, e.g., DuSesoi v. United Refining Co., 549 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D. Pa.
1982); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Shoucair v.
Read, 88 A.D.2d 718, 451 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3d Dep't 1982); Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co.,
285 S.E.2d 679 (W. Va. 1981).
325. Chamberlain v. Bissell Inc., 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
326. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 930 (S.D.
Ga. 1983); Avallone v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 931 (D. Del.
1982); Forde v. Royal's, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Fla. 1982); Brudnicki v.
General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Rawson v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982); Hentzel v. Singer Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 290,
188 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1982); Droz v. Pacific Nat'l Ins. Co., 138 Cal. App. 3d 181, 188
Cal. Rptr. 10 (1982); Gmuer v. Garner, 426 So. 2d 972 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 289 S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982).
327. Sherman v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 535 F. Supp. 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Shaitelman v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 517 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Murphy
v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983).
328. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F. Supp. 572 (D. Md. 1982);
Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 548 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Perry v.
Hartz Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982); Magnan v. Anaconda
Indus., 37 Conn. Supp. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980); Vacca v. General Elec. Credit
Corp., 88 A.D.2d 740, 451 N.Y.S.2d 869 (3d Dep't 1982); Nye v. Department of
Livestock, 639 P.2d 498 (Mont. 1982).
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with employment contracts.32 9 Employees have also relied on the
doctrines of promissory 330 and equitable 331 estoppel to establish liabil-
ity for the wrongful termination of at-will relationships. Although
actual liability on the foregoing theories of recovery has not been
imposed in many at-will cases, these theories are frequently pleaded as
alternative causes of action to abusive discharge claims.
A. Tortious Interference with Employment Contracts
In order to state a cause of action for tortious interference with
employment contracts, employees must allege the following:
the existence of a valid business relationship (not necessarily evi-
denced by an enforceable contract) or expectancy; knowledge of
the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferer; an
intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termina-
tion of the relationship or expectancy; and resultant damage to the
party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.3 32
329. Taylor v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981); RJM
Sales & Mktg. Inc. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn. 1982);
Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Cashman v.
Shinn, 109 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 441 N.E.2d 940 (1982); Pinsof v. Pinsof, 107 Ill. App.
3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d 525 (1982); Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv.
Sh. 2287, 429 N.E.2d 21.
330. Walker v. Modern Realty of Mo., Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982); Page
v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982); Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 554 F. Supp. 327 (D. Colo. 1983); Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 140 Vt.
114, 435 A.2d 952 (1981).
331. Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 140 Vt. 114, 435 A.2d 952 (1981); Reiter v.
Yellowstone County, 627 P.2d 845 (Mont. 1981); Bates v. Jim Walter Resources,
Inc., 418 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1982).
332. Pinsof v. Pinsof, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1037, 438 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1982)
(quoting City of Rock Falls v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 359, 363,
300 N.E.2d 331, 333 (1973)); accord Cashman v. Shinn, 109 I11. App. 3d 1112, 441
N.E.2d 940 (1982).
Section 766 of the Second Restatement of Torts defines "Intentional Interference
with Performance of Contract by Third Person" as follows:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of
a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third
person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform
the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss
resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
Section 767 sets forth the following factors for determining whether there has been
tortious interference:
In determining whether an actor's conduct is intentionally interfering with
a contract or a prospective contractual relation of another is improper or
not, consideration is given to the following factors:
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It is generally agreed that a party to an employment relationship
cannot be liable for tortious interference with that relationship. 333
Most courts have not considered employment-at-will contracts as
cognizable business relationships for purposes of tortious interfer-
ence. 334 Recent cases, however, have departed from this rule where
both parties to the at-will employment relationship were willing and
desirous of continuing the relationship. 335 In Cashman v. Shinn 336 an
Illinois appellate court, although recognizing this exception to the
general rule, nevertheless held that plaintiff-president did not as a
matter-of-law have the necessary expectation of continued employ-
ment where the evidence established that all of the defendant's direc-
tors had agreed to fire him if he did not resign. 337 In other cases where
less than a majority of a board of directors had attempted to oust an
employee, presumptions of continued employment were sustained. 338
Managerial and supervisory personnel will not be liable for tortious
interference with employment contracts where they are acting on
behalf of the employer within their scope of employment. 339 Corpo-
rate officials, however, acting in bad faith or with malice for their
own personal benefit may be liable in tort for their wrongful interfer-
ence. 340 The burden of proof to establish privilege as an affirmative
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor
and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference
and
(g) the relations between the parties.
Id. § 767.
333. Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 930 (S.D.
Ga. 1983); Muller v. Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
334. RJM Sales & Mktg., Inc. v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Minn.
1982); Pinsof v. Pinsof, 107 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 438 N.E.2d 525 (1982).
335. Cashman v. Shinn, 109 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 441 N.E.2d 940 (1982); Kemper v.
Worcester, 106 Ill. App. 3d 121, 435 N.E.2d 827 (1982); TAD, Inc. v. Siebert, 63 Ill.
App. 3d 1001, 380 N.E.2d 963 (1978); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 766 comment g (1979).
336. 109 Ill. App. 3d 1112, 441 N.E.2d 940 (1982).
337. Id. at 1118, 441 N.E.2d at 944.
338. Kemper v. Worcester, 106 Ill. App. 3d 121, 435 N.E.2d 827 (1982);
Kozlowsky v. Westminster Nat'l Bank, 6 Cal. App. 3d 593, 86 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1970).
339. Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Gram v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N.E.2d 21.
340. Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Mo. 1979);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980);
cf. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2287, 429 N.E.2d 21.
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defense to a cause of action for tortious interference with employment
contracts is on the defendants.341
B. Promissory and Equitable Estoppel
As a general proposition of law, "the principle of promissory or
equitable estoppel cannot be utilized to create primary contractual
liability where none would otherwise exist." 342 Essential to the princi-
ples of estoppel is the detrimental reliance by one party upon the
representations of the other party. 343 "[A]lthough equitable estoppel
might transform an otherwise nonbinding agreement into a legally
binding contract, ' 344 most courts continue to reject wrongful dis-
charge claims based on the principles of estoppel. 345
In Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,34  for example, a federal
district court, applying Colorado law, held that the allegations of
plaintiff-employee that he did several acts in reliance on defendant's
promise that he would have a job "until his retirement" did not state a
In Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 51 U.S.L.W. 4343 (U.S.
Apr. 4, 1983) (No. 81-1574), the United States Supreme Court held that the NLRA
preempted a supervisor's state court action against a union for tortious interference
with his employment contract.
341. Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
Mayes v. Sturdy N. Sales, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 69, 154 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1979).
342. Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903, 905 (Ala. 1982).
343. Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 140 Vt. 114, 435 A.2d 952 (1981); Reiter v.
Yellowstone County, 627 P.2d 845 (Mont. 1981). Section 90 of the Second Restate-
ment of Contracts defines promissory estoppel as follows:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
Equitable estoppel has been defined as follows:
The doctrine of estoppel in pais (equitable estoppel) in its traditional
form states that a party who is guilty of a misrepresentation of existingjact
upon which the other party justifiably relies to his detriment is estopped
from denying his utterances or acts to the detriment of the other party. ...
[I]t is now clear that under the modern doctrine of estoppel a misrepre-
sentation of fact is not necessary-a promise or an innocent representation
of fact being sufficient to form the basis of an estoppel, whether it be
denominated "equitable" or "promissory." Under this view actual fraud,
bad faith or intent to deceive is not essential.
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 445-46 (2d ed. 1977) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis in original).
344. Bates v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903, 905 (Ala. 1982).
345. Walker v. Modern Realty of Mo., Inc., 675 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1982); Page
v. Carolina Coach Co., 667 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1982); Bates v. Jim Walter Re-
sources, Inc., 418 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1982); Reiter v. Yellowstone County, 627 P.2d 845
(Mont. 1981); Brower v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 140 Vt. 114, 435 A.2d 952 (1981).
346. 554 F. Supp. 327 (D. Colo. 1983).
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cause of action under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 347 The court
also held that the plaintiff's claim was not supported by the under-
standing of other employees that their employment with the defend-
ant would continue "as long as they were performing in a satisfactory
manner." 348 In Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,3 49 however, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the defendant-employer was
liable on the theory of promissory estoppel where the plaintiff had left
his former position in reliance on the defendant's promise of employ-
ment which was revoked prior to the plaintiff's commencement of
employment .350
VII. The Effect of Personnel Policies on the
Employment-at-Will Rule
Implied rights to continued employment, absent cause for termina-
tion, based on the provisions of company personnel policies are still
recognized in a limited number of jurisdictions. 35 Most courts, how-
ever, do not consider personnel policy manuals or other employee
handbooks as binding contracts of employment for a definite or un-
specified duration terminable only for "just cause. '3 .52 In this regard,
courts have noted that these documents do not contain the "essential
elements" of employment agreements concerning the terms and condi-
tions of employment, the length of employment, and the job duties
and responsibilities of a particular position.35 3 Nevertheless, company
347. Id. at 330.
348. Id.
349. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
350. The court held that the plaintiff "had a right to assume he would be given a
good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the satisfaction of [the defendant]
once he was on the job." Id. at 116. But see Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods,
440 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (cause of action based on promissory estoppel
recognized but claim dismissed where proof of damages was insufficient).
351. McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.) (California law),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84
(N.D. Ill. 1982) (Illinois law); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471,
308 N.W.2d 459 (1981); Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d
441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982); Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643
P.2d 1276 (1982); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981).
352. See, e.g., Avallone v. Wilmington Medical Center, 553 F. Supp. 931 (D.
Del. 1982); Williams v. Delta Haven, Inc., 416 So. 2d 637 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982); Parker v. United
Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982). See generally DeGiuseppe,
supra note 1, at 44-49.
353. Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d
737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), af'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st
Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979);
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personnel policies relating to fringe benefits may give rise to enforce-




A. Contractual Rights to Job Security
Recent cases demonstrate that personnel policies are generally re-
garded by a majority of jurisdictions as unilateral expressions of com-
pany policy not creating enforceable contract rights to job security.3 55
In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.3 5' an employee who was
summarily terminated did not have a breach of contract claim, even
though the defendant had "issued an employee handbook which
stated that prior to dismissal for unsatisfactory performance a warn-
ing would be given to the employee."'35 7 In dismissing this claim, the
Supreme Court of Montana stated:
The employee handbook was not distributed until about two
years after [plaintiff] was hired, It constituted a unilateral state-
ment of company policies and procedures. Its terms were not bar-
gained for, and there was no meeting of the minds. The policies
may be changed unilaterally at any time. The employee handbook
was not a part of [plaintiff's] employment contract at the time she
was hired, nor could it have been a modification to her contract
because there was no new and independent consideration for its
terms .... Therefore the handbook requirement of notice prior to
termination is not enforceable as a contract right.3 58
Similarly, in Avallone v. Wilmington Medical Center,3 59 a nurse did
not have a contractual claim for wrongful discharge under Delaware
accord Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
354. See notes 368-400 infra and accompanying text. See generally DeGiuseppe,
supra note 1, at 50-68.
355. See, e.g., Cote v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 558 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (North Carolina law); Rogers v. IBM Corp., 500 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(Pennsylvania law); Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982);
Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979);
Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975); Johnson v.
National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l
Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96
Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791,
416 N.YS.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421
N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979). Contra Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, No. C8-82-543
(Minn. Apr. 29, 1983); Hernandez v. Home Educ. Livelihood Program, Inc., 98
N.M. 125, 645 P.2d 1381, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982) (personnel
policy procedures relating to termination created implied-in-fact contract rights).
356. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
357. Id. at 1066.
358. Id.
359. 553 F. Supp. 931 (D. Del. 1982).
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law based on a grievance procedure in an employee handbook which
was promulgated approximately nine years after she was initially
employed. 36 0
Courts have also been reluctant to imply a "just cause" standard in
employment relationships of an indefinite duration. 36 ' In Parker v.
United Airlines, Inc. 36 2 plaintiff-employee alleged that she had an
implied agreement with the defendant that her employment could
only be terminated for "just cause. ' 363 Plaintiff's claim was based on
an employment status form to which she assented stating that "she
would be granted 'regular employment' upon completion of a six-
month probationary period"; a statement by the defendant's president
that she would be " 'treated fairly' " on her job; and an employee
manual which did not expressly state that she could be summarily
discharged, but provided that "an employee may be discharged for
cause, furloughed for economic reasons, or resign. "364 The plaintiff
also claimed that the defendant's grievance procedure implied a "just
cause" standard for terminations of employment.
36 5
Despite the clear language of the employee manual concerning
terminations of employment, the Washington appellate court held
that the plaintiff's "claim of an implied agreement amounts merely to
360. Id. at 936-37. The federal court, in reaching its decision, relied on Heideck v.
Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982), where the court stated:
The Booklet in question here was issued by defendant after plaintiff began
her employment. It was a unilateral expression of the defendant's policies
and procedures on a number of topics, issued for the guidance and benefit
of employees. The Booklet does not grant to any employee a specific term
of employment and does not, therefore, alter plaintiff's "at will" employ-
ment status. No error was committed by the Superior Court in awarding
summary judgment for defendant.
Id. at 1097.
361. See cases cited in note 352 supra; see also Simpson v. Western Graphics
Corp., 293 Or. 96, 643 P.2d 1276 (1982) (employer's determination of "just cause"
under personnel policy suffices and actual "just cause" for discharge need not be
established).
362. 32 Wash. App. 722, 649 P.2d 181 (1982).
363. Id. at 724, 649 P.2d at 183.
364. Id.
365. Id. The grievance procedure was instituted for the following reason:
In any sizeable organization, friction or misunderstanding may arise be-
cause of the wide variety of circumstances under which employees work.
It is, therefore, to the advantage of both the employee and the company
that a method of presenting problems be provided so that corrections and
adjustments can be made where appropriate. In this light, the employee
grievance procedure has been established as outlined below to provide a
method for correcting the misapplication of company policies and/or pro-
cedures.
Id. at 726-27, 649 P.2d at 183-84 (emphasis in original).
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her subjective understanding that she would be discharged only with
just cause. .. . [S]uch an understanding is insufficient in law to imply
an agreement. ' 36 6 In reaching this decision, the court stated that the
absence in the employee manual of an express right to terminate
employees at-will did not imply that discharges could only be effectu-
ated for cause. Moreover, the court declined to infer any job security
rights from the defendant's grievance procedure which, according to
the court, merely reflected "company policy to treat employees in a
fair and consistent manner, allowing full discussion of adverse
actions." 367
1. Michigan Cases
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan368 the Su-
preme Court of Michigan held that company personnel policies and
procedures can give rise to contractual rights for continued employ-
ment, absent cause for termination, "just as are rights so derived to
bonuses, pensions and other forms of compensation as previously held
by Michigan courts." 369 In recognizing this principle, the court found
sufficient evidence of an express agreement not to discharge except for
"just cause" based on the specific language of the defendant's person-
nel policy manual and oral assurances of job security given to the
plaintiff during his hiring interview. 37 0 The Toussaint court noted,
however, that an exception to this holding could exist where an em-
ployer who has not agreed to job security protects "itself by entering
into a written contract which explicitly provides that the employee
serves at the pleasure or at the will of the employer or as long as his
services are satisfactory to the employer. '" 31
Relying on the exception set forth in Toussaint, a federal court in
Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 372 held that under Michigan law an
employee had no "legitimate expectation" of job security based on a
statement in his employment application providing that he could" 'be
terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any
366. Id. at 727, 649 P.2d at 184.
367. Id.
368. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980); see generally DeGiuseppe, supra
note 1, at 46-50.
369. 408 Mich. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894.
370. Id. at 620, 292 N.W.2d at 895. See also Lichnovsky v. Ziebart Intl Corp.,
414 Mich. 228, 324 N.W.2d 732 (1982) (franchise agreement for indefinite period
terminable only for "cause" was enforceable).
371. 408 Mich. at 612 n.24, 292 N.W.2d at 891 n.24.
372. 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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time, at the option of either the Company or [the employee].' "373 In
Schipani v. Ford Motor Co.,374 however, a Michigan appellate court
subsequently limited the Toussaint exception by recognizing that writ-
ten or oral assurances of continued employment may negate an express
disclaimer of job security contained in an employment contract. 375
Further clarification of the Toussaint rule was provided in Schwartz
v. Michigan Sugar Co. 76 where a Michigan appellate court recog-
nized that implied-in-fact contractual rights to job security can exist
based on the circumstances of an employment relationship, even in
the absence of express statements of company policy or procedure. 377
373. Id. at 346.
The application stated in full:
I certify that the information contained in this application is correct to the
best of my knowledge and understand that falsification of this information
is grounds for dismissal in accordance with Sears, Roebuck and Co. policy.
I authorize the references listed above to give you any and all information
concerning my previous employment and any pertinent information they
may have, personal or otherwise, and release all parties from all liability
for any damage that may result from furnishing same to you. In consider-
ation of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of
Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be
terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any
time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no
store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the
president or vice-president of the Company, has any authority to enter
into any agreement for employment for any specified period of time, or to
make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
Id. (emphasis in original).
374. 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981).
375. Id. at 613-14, 302 N.W.2d at 310-11. The plaintiff in Schipani signed a
written employment contract which stated:
I understand that my employment is not for any definite time, and may be
terminated at any time, without advance notice by either myself or Ford
Motor Company.
Id. at 610, 302 N.W.2d at 309. With respect to the effect of this disclaimer, the court
stated that the decision of Kari v. General Motors Corp., 402 Mich. 926, 282 N.W.2d
925 (1978), rev'g 79 Mich. App. 93, 261 N.W.2d 222 (1977), may indicate that
"under appropriate circumstances, oral promises may negate the effect of disclaimers
which are intended to absolve employers from liability for policies presented in
handbooks or other employer literature." 102 Mich. App. at 614, 302 N.W.2d at 311;
see cases cited in note 407 infra for a discussion of the effect of disclaimers on fringe
benefits set forth in personnel policies.
376. 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981).
377. Id. at 478, 308 N.W.2d at 461-62. Concerning the requirements for implied-
in-fact contracts, the court quoted the following language from Erickson v. Goodell
Oil Co., 384 Mich. 207, 211-12, 180 N.W.2d 798, 800 (1970):
A contract implied in fact arises under circumstances which, according
to the ordinary course of dealing and common understanding, of men,
show a mutual intention to contract. In re Munro's Estate (1941), 296
Mich. 80 [295 N.W. 567]. A contract is implied in fact where the intention
as to it is not manifested by direct or explicit words between the parties,
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Federal courts in recent cases have narrowly construed the parame-
ters of Toussaint in determining whether employees had been denied
their contractual rights to job security under company personnel poli-
cies. In Chamberlain v. Bissell Inc. ,378 for example, a federal district
court held that an employer had "good cause" under company policy
to discharge the plaintiff without notice based on actual and antici-
pated work-related problems with his job performance. 379 Because the
company had not adopted a prior notice policy, the court affirmed the
plaintiff's discharge reasoning that "Toussaint itself imposes no duties
on employers, it merely holds that employers may impose duties on
themselves through the adoption and dissemination of employment
policies." 380 Similarly, in Summers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 381 a
federal district court, applying Michigan law, held that the plaintiff
had no "legitimate expectation of a just cause determination prior to
demotion" under express company policy which permitted his em-
ployment to be summarily terminated and precluded his reliance on
subsequent representations to the contrary. 382
but is to be gathered by implication for or proper deduction from the
conduct of the parties, language used or things done by them, or other
pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. Miller v. Stevens
(1923), 224 Mich. 626 [195 N.W. 481].
106 Mich. App. at 477, 308 N.W.2d at 461.
The Schwartz court, therefore, concluded:
Thus, an employer's conduct and other pertinent circumstances may
establish an unwritten "common law" providing the equivalent of a just
cause termination policy. Rules and understandings, promulgated and
fostered by the employer, may justify a legitimate claim to continued
employment. Toussaint, supra, 408 Mich. 617-18, 292 N.W.2d 880, quot-
ing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-
2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Nonetheless, a mere subjective expectancy
on the part of an employee will not create such a legitimate claim. Perry,
supra.
106 Mich. App. at 477-78, 308 N.W.2d at 462.
378. 547 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
379. Id. at 1078-79.
380. Id. at 1080.
381. 549 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
382. Id. at 1162. The plaintiff's employment contract provided:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and
regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compen-
sation can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without
notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I
understand that no store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and
Co., other than the president or vice president of the Company, has any
authority to enter into any agreement for employment for any specified
period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
Id. at 1161. See also Morris v. Chem-Lawn Corp., 541 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mich.
1982) (NLRA preempted breach of employment contract claim under Michigan
law).
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2. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.
New York courts have generally agreed that, absent mutuality of
obligation, personnel policy manuals and other employee handbooks
do not create enforceable contract rights to job security. 38 3 In this
regard, the court in Chin v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 384
noted that these documents do not "describe or define the duties and
responsibilities of the particular position, the length of employment or
the terms of compensation-all essential elements in an employment
agreement. ' 385 Similarly, in Edwards v. Citibank, N.A. 38 it was
recognized that" [t]he issuance of a manual by the employer. . . does
not create an equitable estoppel which would preclude the employer
from terminating an employee's employment except in compliance
with the manual. 387
In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc. ,388 however, the New York Court
of Appeals held that a contractual right to job security can exist in
employment relationships for an indefinite term, even in the absence
of mutuality of obligation, based on the presence of "sufficient consid-
eration. 13 89 Concerning the sufficiency of consideration, the court
383. See, e.g., Kings v. Cornell Univ., 81 A.D.2d 712, 439 N.Y.S.2d 445 (3d Dep't
1981); Cerkevich v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., N.Y.L.J., Dec. 1, 1981, at 6, col.
4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979), aff'd, 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327
(1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020
(1980); Chin v. American Tel & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd, 70 A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal
denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396 N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979); but see
Wernham v. Moore, 77 A.D.2d 262, 432 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't 1980) (motion to
dismiss denied where Mission Society manual could have constituted bilateral agree-
ment to discharge only for cause); Williams v. Action for a Better Community, Inc.,
51 A.D.2d 876, 380 N.Y.S.2d 138 (4th Dep't 1976) (employee who was a "permanent
employee" under personnel practices code could only be discharged for "justifiable
cause").
384. 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), af'd, 70
A.D.2d 791, 416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 603, 396
N.E.2d 207, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1028 (1979).
385. 96 Misc. 2d at 1073, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
386. 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d
875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980).
387. 74 A.D.2d at 1073, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 328.
388. 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982).
389. Id. at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 444, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 196. In Stewart v. Albert
Einstein College of Medicine, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 12, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1983), a plaintiff's allegations of "sufficient consideration" based on his 20
years of exemplary service and the existence of a layoff provision recognizing senior-
ity rights in a company manual did not establish the existence of a contract where the
manual was issued 12 years after the plaintiff was initially employed and was merely
a guide to day-to-day personnel policy decisions.
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stated, "[f]ar from consideration needing to be coexistensive or even
proportionate, the value or measurability of the thing forborne or
promised is not crucial so long as it is acceptable to the promisee. '' 3 0
In determining whether the presumption of an employment-at-will
status is overcome, the court instructed the trier of fact to consider the
"totality" of the parties' relationship, " 'including their writings'
and their antecedent negotiations. a3 1
Plaintiff-employee in Weiner claimed that "he was discharged
without the 'just and sufficient cause' or the rehabilitative efforts
specified in the employer's personnel handbook and allegedly prom-
ised at the time he accepted the employment. s3 2 The plaintiff, who
was summarily dismissed for "lack of application," had allegedly been
induced by the defendant to leave another company with the assur-
ance that he would not be discharged without cause. This assurance
was evidently confirmed by a statement in an employment applica-
tion form providing that the plaintiff's "employment would be subject
to the provisions of [the defendant's] 'handook on personnel policies
and procedures.' -393 The plaintiff also claimed that he had rejected
other employment offers based on the assurance of job security and
had been specifically instructed to follow the "strict procedures" of the
dismissal standards set forth in the defendant's handbook in order to
avoid any legal liability for the company. 39 4
Based on these facts, the Weiner court found "sufficient evidence of
a contract and a breach to sustain a cause of action." 3 5 Two justices
dissented from the majority decision on the grounds that there was no
evidence that the defendant had intended to be contractually bound
by the contents of its personnel policies and employment applica-
tions.3 16 The dissent also implied that the majority's decision could
force businesses to move out of New York State resulting in further job
losses . 39 7
The parameters of the Weiner decision were severely limited by the
New York Court of Appeals in Murphy v. American Home Products
Corp.3 8 to cases involving an "express limitation" on an employer's
390. 57 N.Y.2d at 464, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
391. Id. at 466, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198.
392. Id. at 460, 443 N.E.2d at 442, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 194.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 465-66, 443 N.E.2d at 445, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 467, 443 N.E.2d at 446, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (Wachtler, J., dissent-
ing).
397. Id. at 469, 443 N.E.2d at 447, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
398. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1983). For a further discussion of Murphy,
see notes 305-14 supra and accompanying text.
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right to discharge employees at will. 39 The plaintiff in Murphy al-
leged that he was wrongfully terminated for reporting to officers and
directors of the defendant-employer, in accordance with internal
company regulations contained in a manual, certain unlawful ac-
counting practices and for refusing to engage in these improprieties.
Without allowing discovery, the court dismissed the plaintiff's breach
of contract claim stating that his "general references" to the alleged
manual did not suffice under Weiner to state a cause of action. 40 0
B. Contract Liability for Fringe Benefits
Courts continue to recognize that company personnel policies may
create an implied-in-fact contract liability for fringe benfits in em-
ployment-at-will relationships provided that the offer is communi-
cated to employees. 40 Notice of benefit policies may be disseminated
to employees through personnel policy manuals, company notices,
other employees or past practice. After receiving notice of these poli-
cies, employees can accept the offer of the fringe benefits by remain-
ing in the employ of the company. 40 2 The principle of promissory
estoppel may also entitle employees to receive personnel policy bene-
fits. 40 3
Sufficient consideration for the offer of the fringe benefits is pro-
vided by the employees' continued services to the company. 40 4 Most
jurisdictions agree that it is immaterial whether employees would
have continued their employment even in the absence of the company
benefit policies in determining whether sufficient consideration ex-
ists. 40 5 As long as the benefit policy creates an offer capable of accept-
ance by continued employment, it will not be viewed as a mere
399. 58 N.Y.2d at 305, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
400. Id.
401. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Amax, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 692, 288 S.E.2d 49 (1982);
Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 56 N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (Ct. App.
1982); Saunders v. Big Bros., Inc., 115 Misc. 2d 845, 454 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1982); see generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 50-68.
402. Hinkeldey v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494, 502 (Mo. 1971); DeVita
v. Rand McNally & Co., 44 Misc. 2d 906, 256 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Justice Ct. 1965); see
DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 51-53.
403. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959); Hilton v. Alexander &
Baldwin, Inc., 66 Wash. 2d 30, 400 P.2d 772 (1965).
404. Chinn v. China Nat'l Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91
(1955); Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956);
Hercules Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949). But see
Rynar v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 560 F. Supp. 619 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mutuality of obliga-
tion required for severance pay plan).
405. Anthony v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 51 N.J. Super. 139, 143 A.2d
762 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958); Martin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d
208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
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gratuity payable at the discretion of a company. 40 6 The use of dis-
claimers is personnel policy manuals, however, may negate the intent
to create a contractual offer capable of acceptance for fringe bene-
fits. 407
Employers may establish the terms and conditions upon which
employees are entitled to receive fringe benefits.408 Similarly, employ-
ers may modify on notice to employees company fringe benefit plans,
provided that the modification does not cause the forfeiture of accrued
benefits. 40 Nevertheless, ambiguities concerning the eligibility of em-
ployees to receive personnel policy benefits are generally resolved
against the employer. 410
1. Vacation Benefits
Vacation benefits, like severance pay, 41' bonuses, 412 and commis-
sions, 41 3 have been considered as a deferred form of compensation
giving rise to enforceable contract rights in at-will employment rela-
406. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 53-54.
407. Borden v. Skinner Chuck Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 184, 150 A.2d 607 (1958);
Spooner v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 47 Wash. 2d 454, 287 P.2d 735 (1955); Calkins v.
Boeing Co., 8 Wash. App. 347, 506 P.2d 329 (1973); but see Novack v. Bilnor Corp.,
26 A.D.2d 572, 271 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d Dep't 1966) (disclaimer in profit-sharing
agreement construed as offer for unilateral contract).
408. See, e.g., Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604,
647 P.2d 1274 (1982); New Mexico State Lab. & Indus. Comm'n v. Deming Nat'l
Bank, 96 N.M. 673, 634 P.2d 695 (1981).
409. Gebhard v. Royce Aluminum Corp., 296 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1961); Hercules
Powder Co. v. Brookfield, 189 Va. 531, 53 S.E.2d 804 (1949); but see Reading &
Bates, Inc. v. Whittington, 208 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1968) (modification in term of
employment without notice was ineffective to deprive employee of workers' compen-
sation benefits).
410. Fujimoto v. Rice Grande Pickle Co., 414 F.2d 648 (5th Cir. 1969); Hinkeldey
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 470 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1971).
411. See, e.g., Rozeboom v. International Harvester Co., No. C82-214A (N.D.
Ca. Feb. 7, 1983); Fletcher v. Amax, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 692, 288 S.E.2d 49 (1982);
Brooks v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co,, 56 N.C. App. 801, 290 S.E.2d 370 (Ct. App.
1982); Saunders v. Big Bros., Inc., 115 Misc. 2d 845, 454 N.Y.S.2d 787 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1982); see generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 56-60; Comment, Severance
Pay, Sales of Assets, and the Resolution of Omitted Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 593
(1982). See also Pinto v. Zenith Radio Corp., 480 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ill. 1979), afJ'd
without opinion, 618 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1980) (federal rather than state law applied
in action to enforce severance pay plan under ERISA).
412. See generally Dove v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 931 (Ind. Ct. App.
1982); DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 61-65.
413. See generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 65-68; see also Drummey v.
Henry, 115 Mich. App. 107, 320 N.W.2d 309 (1982) (oral agreement for commissions
was not unenforceable under the statute of frauds), appeal denied, 330 N.W.2d 691
(Mich. 1983); Mackie v. LaSalle Indus., 460 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1st Dep't 1983) (at-will
employee was not entitled to commissions after the termination of her employment).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
tionships. 414 Unlike company policy statements on termination proce-
dure, 41 5 courts generally agree that employees may be entitled to
receive these benefits under plans promulgated or modified after their
initial date of employment. 416 Moreover, state law may protect the
rights of employees to receive vested vacation benefits in accordance
with the provisions of company policy.41
7
As with other fringe benfits, employers may establish the terms and
conditions on which employees are entitled to receive vacation bene-
fits provided these conditions are not unlawful or otherwise contrary
414. See, e.g., Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183
Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982); Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan.
604, 647 P.2d 1274 (1982); Berteau v. Wiener Corp., 362 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App.
1978); New Mexico State Lab. & Indus. Comm'n v. Deming Nat'l Bank, 96 N.M.
673, 634 P.2d 695 (1981); Glenville Gage Co. v. Industrial Bd. of Appeals, 70
A.D.2d 283, 421 N.Y.S.2d 408 (3d Dep't 1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 777, 417 N.E.2d
1009, 436 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980); Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 573 S.W.2d
493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Martin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
415. See notes 355-67 supra and accompanying text.
416. See, e.g., Martin v. Mann Merchandising, Inc., 570 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1978) (severance pay).
417. Under New York law, for example, it is clear that vacations with pay are a
"benefit or wage supplement" within the meaning of § 198-c(2) of the New York
Labor Law. See, e.g., Ross v. Specialty Insulation Mfg. Co., 71 A.D.2d 766, 419
N.Y.S.2d 311 (3d Dep't 1979). That section places upon employers certain time limits
within which earned wage supplements or benefits must be provided to employees.
Before the provisions of section 198-c become applicable, however, it must be estab-
lished that the employer in question is a party to an "agreement" to pay or provide
such benefits. Id. Such an agreement may exist where an employer has promulgated
a written personnel policy providing for vacations with pay upon the completion of
specified lengths of service or specified annual or semi-annual dates. See Glenville
Gage Co. v. Industrial Bd. of Appeals, 70 A.D.2d 283, 421 N.Y.S.2d 408 (3d Dep't
1979), afJ'd, 52 N.Y.2d 777, 417 N.E.2d 1009, 436 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980). In order to
facilitate the resolution of fringe benefit claims, section 195 of the New York Labor
Law requires employers to notify all employees, in writing or by public posting of
"the employer's policy on sick leave, vacation, personal leave, holidays and hours."
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 195 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
Once it has been established that an "agreement" to provide vacation benefits
exists, an employer may not postpone the payment or provision for such a benefit
more than 30 days after it becomes due. Id. § 198-c(l). Where an employer does
postpone the benefit more than 30 days after it is required to provide it, the employer
may be found guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. Where the employer is a corporation, the
president, secretary, treasurer or other appropriate officer may be subject to criminal
sanctions. Id. A civil penalty also may be assessed against employers under the
provisions of the New York Labor Law. Id. § 197. Nevertheless, it must be empha-
sized that it is the terms of the agreement and not statutory law which determines
when a benefit is required to be provided to an employee. See Ross v. Specialty
Insulation Mfg. Co., 71 A.D.2d 766, 419 N.Y.S.2d 311 (3d Dep't 1979).
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to public policy. 418 Courts have recognized that employees have no
"inherent right" to vacations or payment for unused vacation time
other than those rights established by the agreement of the parties. 419
In this regard, the accrual of vacation benefits may be subject to valid
condition precedents concerning the eligibility of employees to receive
vacations. 420 Once vacation benefits have accrued, however, they may
not be forfeited. 42 1
Recent cases demonstrate that employers may not be required to
convert vacation time into a lump sum payment in the absence of an
agreement to that effect. 422 In Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medi-
cal Center423 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that there was noth-
ing under Kansas law prohibiting an employer from conditioning the
payment of unused vacation time "on the giving of notice, or length of
service or any other term which is not unconscionable. ' 424 The Kansas
Supreme Court thus upheld a two-week notice requirement under
company policy for the lump sum payment of vacation benefits on
voluntary terminations. 425 Similarly, in New Mexico State Labor &
Industrial Commission v. Deming National Bank, 421 the Supreme
Court of New Mexico held that an employee who voluntarily termi-
nated her employment prior to her scheduled vacation period did not
have a claim for vacation pay under company policy prohibiting the
payment of compensation in lieu of vacation time. 42 17 The court rea-
418. Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 647 P.2d
1274 (1982); New Mexico State Lab. & Indus. Comm'n v. Deming Nat'l Bank, 96
N.M. 673, 634 P.2d 695 (1981).
419. Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 647 P.2d
1274, 1280 (1982) (citing Wheeler v. Mission Elec. & Plumbing Supply, Inc., 267 Or.
209, 515 P.2d 1323 (1973); Walters v. Center Elec., Inc., 8 Wash. App. 322, 506
P.2d 883 (1973); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1968)).
420. Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 647 P.2d
1274 (1982); New Mexico State Lab. & Indus. Comm'n v. Deming Nat'l Bank, 96
N.M. 673, 634 P.2d 695 (1981); Glenville Gage Co. v. Industrial Bd. of Appeals, 70
A.D.2d 283, 421 N.Y.S.2d 408 (3d Dep't 1979), a-J'd, 52 N.Y.2d 777, 417 N.E.2d
1009, 436 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1980).
421. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr.
846 (1982); Berteau v. Wiener Corp., 362 So. 2d 806 (La. Ct. App. 1978); DeVita v.
Rand McNally & Co., 44 Misc. 2d 906, 256 N.Y.S.2d 9 (Justice Ct. 1965).
422. Sweet v. Stormont Vail Regional Medical Center, 231 Kan. 604, 647 P.2d
1274 (1982); New Mexico State Lab. & Indus. Comm'n v. Deming Nat'l Bank, 96
N.M. 673, 634 P.2d 695 (1981); accord Phillips v. Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 573
S.W.2d 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978).
423. 231 Kan. 604, 647 P.2d 1274 (1982).
424. Id. at 610, 647 P.2d at 1280.
425. Id.
426. 96 N.M. 673, 634 P.2d 695 (1981).
427. Id. at 674, 634 P.2d at 696.
1983]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
soned that the condition requiring employees to take vacation time in
order to receive vacation pay was not "unconscionable or against
public policy." 428s
The issue of when vacation benefits vest or accrue has also been
subject to recent judicial scrutiny. In Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up
Co.429 plaintiff-employee was terminated prior to the anniversary date
on which his vacation benefits would have fully accrued under com-
pany policy. Plaintiff claimed that he had a vested right to a propor-
tionate share of his vacation pay for the amount of time he actually
worked. The company argued that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy
the condition precedent to the vesting of vacation rights under com-
pany policy and, therefore, was not entitled to receive any vacation
pay. 430
In interpreting the phrase "vested vacation time" under section
227.3 of the California Labor Code, 431 the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that vacation benefits are a form of deferred compensation
which, like wages, are earned on a pro rata basis as services are
rendered. The court, in reaching this conclusion, stated:
428. Id. In support of its decision, the court quoted the following language from
Bondio v. Joseph Binder, Inc., 24 So. 2d 398, 401 (La. Ct. App. 1946):
The stipulation in the contract for the allowance of a vacation to employ-
ees is merely a recognition by management and labor that a short interval
of complete rest and relaxation from daily routine with the benefit of full
pay is essential to the mental and physical wellbeing of the workman. Such
vacations or rest periods not only redound to the good of the daily worker
but also to industry, in that the employee returns to his job refreshed,
healthier and with new vigor and zeal. Vacation, therefore, contemplates
a continuance of employment. The parties to the agreement, in contract-
ing for the allowance of vacations, did not intend that the stipulation
should be considered as providing a cash bonus in lieu of vacation pay for
those employees who might see fit to discontinue their employment prior
to the time the employer fixed the dates upon which the vacations would
be given.
96 N.M. at 674, 634 P.2d at 696.
429. 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
430. Id.
431. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1983) provides:
Unless otherwise provided by a collective-bargaining agreement, when-
ever a contract of employment or employer policy provides for paid vaca-
tions, and an employee is terminated without having taken off his vested
vacation time, all vested vacation shall be paid to him as wages at his final
rate in accordance with such contract of employment or employer policy
respecting eligibility or time served; provided, however, that an employ-
ment contract or employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested
vacation time upon termination. The Labor Commissioner or a designated
representative, in the resolution of any dispute with regard to vested
vacation time, shall apply the principles of equity and fairness.
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The right to a paid vacation, when offered in an employer's policy
or contract of employment, constitutes deferred wages for services
rendered. Case law from this state and others, as well as principles
of equity and justice, compel the conclusion that a proportionate
right to a paid vacation "vests" as the labor is rendered. Once
vested, the right is protected from forfeiture by section 227.3. On
termination of employment, therefore, the statute requires that an
employee be paid in wages for a pro rata share of his vacation
pay. 43 2
The implementation of the Suastez decision, however, was enjoined
by a federal district court pending a hearing on whether the decision is
preempted by the provisions of ERISA and the NLRA.
433
2. Forfeiture for Competition Clauses
In most jurisdictions, deferred compensation agreements may con-
tain "forfeiture for competition" clauses providing for the forfeiture of
specified benefits should employees elect to work for a competitor.
43 4
These clauses are considered to be, in effect, a condition precedent to
an employee's entitlement to deferred compensation. 435 Courts, how-
ever, have not enforced "forfeiture for competition" clauses where
they were an unreasonable restraint on trade. 436 Moreover, the provi-
sions of ERISA 43 7 have been interpreted to prohibit the forfeiture of
432. 31 Cal. 3d at 784, 647 P.2d at 128, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 852; but see Lucian v.
All States Trucking Co., 116 Cal. App. 3d 972, 171 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1981) (employer
not liable for incentive bonuses where employees voluntarily quit prior to date on
which the benefits were payable).
433. See DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 41, at A-7 to A-8 (Mar. 1, 1983). For a
discussion of ERISA preemption of state law concerning pension and welfare plans,
see Sasso v. Vachris, 116 Misc. 2d 797, 456 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1982).
434. See generally DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 66-68.
435. See, e.g., Golden v. Kentile Floors, Inc., 512 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1975);
Shandor v. Wells Nat'l Serv. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Sheppard v.
Columbus Packaging Co., 146 Ga. App. 202, 245 S.E.2d 887 (1978); Kristt v.
Whelan, 4 A.D.2d 195, 164 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't 1957), afJ'd, 5 N.Y.2d 807, 155
N.E.2d 116, 181 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1958).
436. See notes 439-41 infra and accompanying text.
Unlike forfeiture for competition clauses, anti-competitive covenants seek to pre-
vent employees from directly competing with their employers both during and after
the term of employment within a specified time period and area. Most jurisdictions
will uphold anti-competitive covenants if they are "reasonable" as to time and area
limitations. Nevertheless, such covenants are generally disfavored in the law because
they tend to restrict competition. See generally Shandor v. Wells Nat'l Serv. Corp.,
478 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 8 Kan. App. 2d
311, 657 P.2d 589 (1983).
437. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1976).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
accrued retirement benefits where employees go to work for a compet-
itor. 438
Most jurisdictions enforce "forfeiture for competition" clauses with-
out regard to the reasonableness of the restraint on the affected em-
ployee. 439 Other courts have adopted a reasonableness test based on
the circumstances of the parties' relationship to enforce forfeiture
clauses only to the extent they are reasonable. 440 Some courts, how-
ever, have held that unreasonably broad "forfeiture for competition"
clauses are invalid and not subject to judicial modification. 44'
In Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos. 442 a Massachusetts appellate court
interpreted the validity of a "golden handcuffs" forfeiture clause de-
signed to prevent key employees from working for competitors under
the reasonableness test adopted in Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler
Corp. of America.443 The clause in question provided that the plain-
tiff, a key employee, "would lose all" if he went to work for a
competitor east of the Mississippi River "for so long as he lives. ' 444 The
plaintiff, within one year after terminating his employment at the
request of the defendant, went to work for another retail food com-
pany which operated stores in the same general area as the defend-
ant. 4
45
In applying the Cheney standards, the Kroeger court affirmed the
limitation of the restrictive period of the "golden handcuffs" to one
year on the grounds that the lifetime prohibition went well beyond
438. Riley v. MEBA Pension Trust, 570 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1977); Cheney v.
Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 377 Mass. 141, 145-46 n.5, 385 N.E.2d 961, 964
n.5 (1979).
439. See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1971);
Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 240 N.W.2d 710 (1976);
see generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968).
440. See, e.g., Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Greeley, 264 Md. 105, 285 A.2d 632(1972); Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 377 Mass. 141, 385 N.E;2d 961
(1979); Lavey v. Edwards, 264 Or. 331, 505 P.2d 342 (1973).
441. See, e.g., Almers v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 265 S.C. 48, 217 S.E.2d 135
(1975); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Balistrieri, 19 Wis. 2d 265, 120 N.W.2d 126
(1963).
442. 13 Mass. App. Ct. 310, 432 N.E.2d 566, appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1102, 440
N.E.2d 1175 (1982).
443. 377 Mass. 141, 385 N.E.2d 961 (1979).
444. 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 311, 432 N.E.2d at 567. "Competing business" was
defined by the agreement as businesses located east of the Mississippi River except for
the States of Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.
445. Id. at 314, 432 N.E.2d at 569. The defendant operated stores in the New
England states, New York and New Jersey, while the competing company had
locations in New York, New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts. The only
direct local competition between the two companies was in Manchester, New Hamp-
shire. Id. at 315, 432 N.E.2d at 569.
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the defendant's "legitimate interests. ' 446 In considering whether the
plaintiff's total forfeiture of deferred compensation, including retire-
ment benefits, was reasonable, the court noted the inequities arising
from the defendant's own abandonment of the "golden handcuffs"
agreement as well as the policy considerations in avoiding the forfeit-
ure of earned retirement benefits. 447 In this regard, the court devised
the rule that "when an employee is discharged in circumstances in-
volving no misconduct by the employee. . . , the employee's deferred
compensation benefits should not be forfeited to the extent those
benefits have been earned, even though the employee violates a valid
post-employment restriction. "448 The plaintiff, therefore, received his
proportionate share of accrued retirement benefits in accordance with
this rule. 449
VIII. Conclusion
The judicial response to the recognition of public policy exceptions
to the employment-at-will rule demonstrates that courts are unwilling
446. Id. The defendant conceded that there were no trade secrets involved. See
Greenwich Mills Co. v. Barrie House Coffee Co., 91 A.D.2d 398, 459 N.Y.S.2d 454
(2d Dep't 1983) (even without express non-solicitation agreement, ex-employee with
knowledge of trade secrets is barred from soliciting former employer's customers). In
addition to the reduction in the time limitation of the "golden handcuffs," the court
affirmed the geographical limitation of the agreement to the New England states,
New York and New Jersey. 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 317-18, 432 N.E.2d at 571. See
generally Blake, Employment Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1960); Mertz, Recent Developments Concerning Employee Covenants Not to Com-
pete: A Quiet "Corbinization" of Massachusetts Law, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 647
(1977).
447. 13 Mass. App. Ct. at 320-22, 432 N.E.2d at 572-73. With respect to review-
ing the reasonableness of forfeiture clauses for key employees, the court stated:
A key executive's bargaining status does not . . .remove the reasonable-
ness of his promise from consideration; it does, however, enlarge judicial
tolerance of restraints by an employer which might be seen as unreasona-
ble between parties of unequal bargaining strength.
Id. at 319, 432 N.E.2d at 571.
448. Id. at 320-21, 432 N.E.2d at 572.
449. Id. With respect to the amount of the plaintiff's recovery, the court stated:
In the case at bar, the employment agreement contemplated retirement
at age sixty-five, unless retirement occurred earlier because of total and
permanent disability. [Plaintiff] was forty-eight in 1961 when the agree-
ment was entered into, thus the agreement envisioned seventeen years of
service by him. He had worked ten years when [defendant] terminated his
employment. [Plaintiff] had, therefore, earned ten seventeenths of his
retirement benefits. The judge found that the cost of purchasing the
annuity benefits [plaintiff] would have received was $71,000. Accord-
ingly, [plaintiff] is entitled to recover ten seventeenths of that amount viz.,
$41,765.
Id. at 321, 432 N.E.2d at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
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to effectuate the purposes of federal and state statutes in the absence
of a clear legislative intent to create private rights of action under
these laws. Courts are also reluctant to adopt causes of action in tort
for abusive discharge to protect employees who are summarily dis-
charged for furthering a public interest to the detriment of their
employers. In this regard, the balancing of the rights of parties in
employment relationships with considerations of public policy has
been viewed as a function of the legislature.
The recognition of public policy exceptions to the at-will rule,
however, does not have to be considered an exclusive function of the
legislature. Courts, in the absence of adequate statutory remedies,
should ensure that the public interests expressed in federal and state
law are not circumvented through the abusive discharge of employees.
Based on these considerations, courts should not continue to place
undue emphasis on the lack of a clear legislative intent to create
private rights of action where an entire statutory framework can be
frustrated by the unlawful concerns of employers. Nevertheless, ab-
sent the appropriate statutory basis, courts would not be obligated to
recognize private rights of action to protect employees from retalia-
tory discharges in contravention of federal and state law.
Moreover, the protection of employees under a given statute can be
achieved without adopting broad causes of action in tort for abusive
discharge by limiting retaliatory discharge claims to clear mandates of
public policy as expressed in federal or state law. Courts, therefore,
would not be confronted with the task of defining the rights and
obligations of the parties in employment relationships in a piecemeal
fashion. Instead, the courts would be effectuating the public policies
already set forth in federal and state law, thereby complementing the
legislative function of maintaining the proper balance between public
interests and the rights of employers and employees. In the final
analysis, however, the parameters of the public policy exception will
probably be defined by the legislature in most jurisdictions based on
the conceded difficulties courts have had in determining the measure
of protection which should be afforded to employees under the at-will
rule.
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